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Around noon in a county jail, an inmate is murdered, brutally stabbed 
to death.1  Three other inmates witness some of the events surrounding 
the murder.  After the murder, these witnesses are threatened, attacked, 
and intimidated.2  Their lives are in danger if their identities are 
 
 1. Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d 203, 206 (Cal. 2000) (“On February 6, 1993, 
during the noon hour, Jose Uribe, an inmate at the Los Angeles County jail, was killed in 
his cell, having been stabbed 37 times with a contraband knife described as a shank.”).  
 2. See id. at 206–08.   
A witness in the instant case was attacked and cut in jail after the killing in this 
case.  The attacker was a member of the prison gang aligned with the Mexican 
Mafia and warned the witness not to testify.  One of the defendants in this case 
threatened a witness while the witness was in protective custody and told the 
witness somebody would get him.  Someone wrote on a wall while a witness 
was in a court holding cell that the witness was dead.  And that the witness was 
a snitch at the time when the witness was in protective custody. 
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disclosed because the Mexican Mafia, a notorious prison gang, is 
allegedly involved in the murder.3  Because of this danger, the trial court 
grants the prosecutor’s request to permanently withhold the witnesses’ 
identities from the defense.4  On appeal, this ruling is reversed.5  The 
California Supreme Court holds that the identities of these crucial 
witnesses6 for the prosecution must be disclosed to the defense at trial, 
despite the fact that they have been attacked and threatened by the 
defendant and that such disclosure will pose a significant danger to the 
witnesses’ safety.7  To withhold the identities of witnesses whose 
 
Id. at 208.  “Witness 1 further testified [before the grand jury] . . . that on the day 
immediately preceding his testimony before the grand jury, he was placed in the same 
jail cell as defendant Alvarado, who threatened to harm him if he testified.”  Id. at 
206–07.  It is unclear from the Alvarado opinion if each of the three witnesses were 
threatened or if the descriptive facts set forth above pertained to only one or two of the 
three witnesses. 
 3. Id. at 207 (“The homicide is believed to have been ordered by the Mexican 
Mafia, a notorious prison gang . . . .”).  
 4. Id. at 208 (stating the trial court’s finding that “[b]ased on the foregoing and 
the other facts disclosed to the court in camera, it is clear that the witnesses 1 through 3 
are in danger and that disclosure of their names would increase the risk of possible 
danger to them . . . .”).    
 5. Id. at 223. 
 6. The phrase “crucial witnesses” is not defined in the California Supreme 
Court’s opinion.  However, in the court of appeal opinion, which was superseded, the 
court described crucial witnesses as those “without whom the state has no viable case” 
and who are not “peripheral, cumulative, or minor.”  Alvarado v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 854, 861 (Ct. App. 1997), rev’d, 5 P.3d 203 (Cal. 2000).  The terms “victim” 
and “witness” will be used interchangeably in this Article, and the use of one term will 
necessarily be intended to include the other.  Furthermore, the issue addressed herein is 
limited to crucial witnesses as defined in this paragraph. 
 7. See Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 205. 
[T]he trial court and the Court of Appeal erred in determining that, when the 
risk to a witness is sufficiently grave, the identity of the witness may be 
permanently withheld from a defendant and the witness may testify 
anonymously at trial even when the witness is a crucial prosecution witness 
and withholding the witness’s identity will impair significantly the defendant’s 
ability to investigate and cross-examine the witness. 
Id. 
Thus, under the cases discussed above, should the witnesses provide such 
crucial testimony at trial, the confrontation clause would prohibit the 
prosecution from relying upon this testimony while refusing to disclose the 
identities of the witnesses under circumstances in which such nondisclosure 
would significantly impair the defense’s ability to investigate or effectively 
cross-examine them. 
Id. at 220; id. at 221 (“At trial, however, the confrontation clause imposes greater 
demands upon the prosecution in that defendants must be afforded an adequate 
opportunity to confront and cross-examine effectively the witnesses who testify against 
them.”); id. at 223 (“Thus, when nondisclosure of the identity of a crucial witness will 
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veracity and credibility are central to the prosecution’s case would, the 
court concludes, significantly impair the defense’s ability to effectively 
investigate and cross-examine the witnesses as required by the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment8 right of confrontation.9  As this Article 
will show, the Alvarado holding is very narrow, requiring disclosure 
only when a witness is crucial to the prosecution and when the witness’s 
credibility is at issue. 
The interesting issue left unresolved by Alvarado is whether the 
identity of a crucial witness whose credibility is not at issue must be 
disclosed to the defense at trial when the witness has been threatened 
and attacked by the defendant or at the defendant’s behest.10  Or, 
whether because of that intimidation, the defendant has waived his right 
of confrontation as to the witness’s identity.  This question is ripe for 
exploration for several reasons.  First, as this Article shows, witness 
intimidation is a national problem.11  Second, waiver by intimidation 
preclude effective investigation and cross-examination of that witness, the confrontation 
clause does not permit the prosecution to rely upon the testimony of that witness at trial 
while refusing to disclose his or her identity.”).   
8. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant
part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
9. The Court in Alvarado limited its decision to federal law.  See Alvarado, 5
P.3d at 211 & n.5.  Therefore, only federal issues will be addressed in this Article.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari and declined to hear this
case.  California v. Alvarado, 532 U.S. 990 (2001).
10. It should be noted that even though one of the defendants in Alvarado had
attacked one of the witnesses, at trial the prosecution proceeded on the theory that it was 
the Mexican Mafia, not the defendants, who were a threat to the witness’s safety.  See 
Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 207–08. 
[T]he trial court’s finding that the safety of the witnesses would be endangered
by disclosure of their identities was based upon the premise that the danger to
the witnesses was posed by the Mexican Mafia, not by the individual
defendants in this case.  Under this circumstance, we do not believe that the
denial of disclosure can be sustained on a waiver theory.
Id. at 221 n.12. 
11. See id. at 222 n.14.
At oral argument, the People pointed out that during the past five years in Los
Angeles County alone, the prosecution has filed special circumstance
allegations stemming from the murder of witnesses in 25 cases, is investigating
1,600 cases of witness intimidation, and “can’t get witnesses to come forward
in over 1,000 gang murders.  Why?  Because we cannot protect them [the
witnesses].”
Id. (alteration in original); see also Carol J. DeFrances et al., Prosecutors in State 
Courts, 1994, in OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN 1 (1996) (reporting that across the nation “75% of the 
[prosecutor’s] offices provided security or assistance for felony case victimes or 
witnesses who had been threatened”); Kerry Murphy Healey, Victim and Witness 
Intimidation: New Developments and Emerging Responses, in NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RESEARCH IN ACTION (1995) (basing the report on interviews 
with thirty-two criminal justice professionals from twenty urban jurisdictions regarding 
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was raised on appeal in Alvarado, but was not fully addressed, and thus 
not resolved.12  Third, the doctrine of waiver by misconduct has a long 
and interesting history, which dates back to the 1600s13 and continues in 
use to this date.14  Last, but not least, this issue is certain to arise in the 
not so distant future.15  For all of these reasons, this Article addresses the 
merits of the waiver doctrine as it relates to this issue.  However, before 
that can be done, it will first be necessary to clarify the limitations of the 
holding in Alvarado, the nature and scope of the Sixth Amendment right 
of confrontation, and the nature of witness intimidation and witness 
rights, and to explore witness protection programs and what alternatives 
to identity disclosure, if any, exist. 
 
the issue of witness intimindation); NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
PREVENTING GANG- AND DRUG-RELATED WITNESS INTIMINDATION vii (1996) (“A number 
of law enforcement agencies and prosecutors’ offices across the country have already 
taken steps to prevent witness intimidation.”). 
 12. See id. at 221 n.12 (“Although they did not raise the issue in the trial court, the 
People now contend that . . . defendants, by threatening certain witnesses, waived any 
constitutional right to obtain disclosure of the witnesses’ identities.”). 
 13. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878).  
 14. See infra Part V.A. 
 15. Unfortunately, only a few studies have been conducted about witness 
intimidation, but those results indicate its existence across the country.  Witness 
intimidation occurs most frequently in gang cases.  Since 1993, the number of gang 
members in California increased from 175,000 to 200,000 to 300,000 in 1999.  BUREAU 
OF INVESTIGATION, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CALIFORNIA GANGS BY THE NEXT 
MILLENNIUM 1 (1999) [hereinafter NEXT MILLENIUM].  In addition, the analyses and 
trends indicate that organized crime has expanded in California and in the United States.  
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE OF CAL., ORGANIZED CRIME IN CALIFORNIA i–iii (1998).  With 
this proliferation and increase, the chance that this issue will arise is great. 
Moreover, juveniles, who make up the majority of the members in criminal street 
gangs, and youth violence are expected to increase by the next decade.  CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 13825.1 notes (a)–(n) (West 2000). 
The problem of youth violence will . . . increase as the juvenile population is 
projected to grow substantially by the next decade.  By the year 2010 the 
number of juveniles who are 15 to 17 years of age is expected to increase 31 
percent. . . .  Juvenile arrest rates for weapons-law violations increased 103 
percent between 1985 and 1994, while juvenile killings with firearms 
quadrupled between 1984 and 1994 . . . .  The number of juvenile homicide 
offenders in 1994 was about 2,800, nearly triple the number in 1984. 
Id. at note (b). 
Furthermore, intelligence information indicates that gang members fourteen through 
twenty-four years of age are the most violent and tend to commit the most gang-related 
homicides.  That population is expected to increase by approximately thirty percent by 
2006, which will result in more gang-related homicides.  OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., 
CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS BULLETIN 2 (2000). 
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II.  UNDER ALVARADO, DISCLOSURE OF A THREATENED WITNESS’S 
IDENTITY IS MANDATED ONLY WHEN CERTAIN FACTORS                           
ARE PRESENT 
A. Introduction 
The Alvarado court’s decision that withholding the identity of crucial 
prosecution witnesses from the defense at trial is unconstitutional is 
narrow in scope and only applies when certain circumstances are 
present.  The Alvarado court did not decide the interesting question left 
open by the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Illinois,16 namely, 
whether the Sixth Amendment is violated when the identity of a 
threatened witness is withheld from the defense at trial, when credibility 
issues are not extant.17 
B. The Facts of Alvarado 
1. The Murder 
Alvarado involved a prison murder.  The defendants, the victim, and 
the three witnesses were all inmates in county jail at the time of the 
homicide.18  The two defendants, Joaquin Alvarado and Jorge Lopez, 
 
 16. Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968). 
 17. In Smith, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right of confrontation was violated when the defense was denied the right to 
ask the real name and address of one of the prosecution’s witness.  See id. at 131.  There 
was no evidence that the witness in Smith had been threatened by the defendant.  See id. 
at 134.  In his concurring opinion, Justice White intimated that cross-examination of a 
witness may be limited by the trial judge when it would endanger the safety of the 
witness. 
In Alford v. United States, the Court recognized that questions which tend 
merely to harass, annoy, or humiliate a witness may go beyond the bounds of 
proper cross-examination.  I would place in the same category those inquiries 
which tend to endanger the personal safety of the witness.  But in these 
situations if the question asked is one that is normally permissible, the State or 
the witness should at the very least come forward with some showing of why 
the witness must be excused from answering the question.  The trial judge can 
then ascertain the interest of the defendant in the answer and exercise an 
informed discretion in making his ruling.  Here the State gave no reasons 
justifying the refusal to answer a quite usual and proper question. 
Id. at 133–34 (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 18. See Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 206–07.  The case came before the court of appeal by a 
writ of mandate, filed by the defendants, after the trial court authorized permanent 
nondisclosure of the witnesses’ identities.  The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s 
ruling, and the defendants then filed a petition for review before the California Supreme 
Court.  See id. at 208–10.  The only facts stated in the opinion are those recounted from 
the grand jury transcript of proceedings, which is summarized in the opinion. The grand 
jury proceedings were held in lieu of a preliminary hearing.  See id. at 208–09.   
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were charged with the murder of inmate Jose Uribe.19  According to the 
grand jury testimony, the victim, Jose Uribe, was housed in cell ten.  The 
three witnesses are referred to in the transcript of the testimony as 
witnesses one, two, and three.20  Witnesses one and two were housed, 
respectively, in cells twelve and eleven.  Witness three was a jail trusty, 
assigned to sweep the cell module in which the murder occurred.21 
Before lunch, on the day of the murder, witness one saw Frank 
Marquez at his cell and heard Marquez ask one of witness one’s 
cellmates for some extra jail clothing.  He also heard Marquez say 
something about a snitch.  Because witness one wanted to curry favor 
with the Hispanic inmates, he gave his own shirt to Marquez.  During 
lunch, witness one remained in his cell.  He saw Marquez, Alvarado, 
Lopez, and two other inmates near his cell.  He then heard an altercation, 
and afterward saw the same five inmates leave the area.22 
On the morning of the same day, witness two saw Marquez arrive at 
his cell and heard Marquez talk to his cellmates.  Marquez told witness 
two that “a snitch was going to be dealt with in cell No. 10” and that 
witness two should “stay away from cell No. 10.”23  About ten minutes 
later, witness two heard a black trusty tell some black inmates to stay 
away from the end of the row, which is where cell ten was located.  
Witness two also remained in his cell during lunch.  Around noon, 
witness two saw Alvarado and Lopez enter cell ten with a third inmate 
and thereafter heard a fight.  He heard someone say something about 
being a snitch.  Immediately thereafter, witness two saw Lopez give a 
bloody shirt to Marquez, who was standing outside cell ten.  He also saw 
a bloody body lying under one of the beds in cell ten.24  This bloody 
body was that of Jose Uribe, who had been stabbed 37 times with a 
prison knife, also known as a shank.25 
 
 19. Id. at 206.  A third defendant, Frank Marquez, a jail trusty, was not a co-
defendant.  Id. 
 20. See id. at 206. 
 21. Id. at 207. 
 22. Id. at 206. 
 23. Id. at 207. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. at 206.  The California Supreme Court omitted from its statement of 
facts witness two’s testimony that during the fight inside cell ten, other inmates made 
noise to drown out Uribe’s cries.  See Alvarado v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 
856 (Ct. App. 1997), rev’d, 5 P.3d 203 (Cal. 2000).  That piece of information is 
important, because it indicates planning, organization, and premeditation by one with 
sufficient power and influence to obtain cooperation from other inmates. 
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That same morning, witness three, the trusty, saw Marquez wrap a 
shank inside a shirt and give it to a Hispanic inmate.  After lunch, he saw 
Marquez take a shirt from someone in the row of the victim’s cell.26 
2. Evidence of Witness Intimidation 
During pretrial proceedings, the prosecution had ex parte hearings 
before the trial judge in camera.  At those hearings, the prosecution 
presented evidence in an effort to establish good cause, under section 
1054.7 of the California Penal Code,27 why disclosure of the witnesses’ 
identities should be denied.28  After hearing the evidence, the trial court 
made several findings, one of which was that the homicide was ordered 
by the notorious Mexican Mafia prison gang and that the defendants, 
although not members, committed the murder to curry favor with the 
gang.29 
The trial court also found that one of the witnesses to the homicide 
had been attacked and knifed after the homicide by a member of a gang 
aligned with the Mexican Mafia.  The attacker had warned the witness 
not to testify.  The trial court found that in another incident, on the day 
before one of the witnesses was to testify before the grand jury, 
Alvarado threatened the witness while the witness was in protective 
custody.30  The court found that in a third incident, someone wrote on 
the wall of a witness’s court holding cell that the witness “was dead,” 
while the witness was in court.31   
 
 26. Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 207. 
 27. California Penal Code section 1054.7 provides: 
  The disclosures required under this chapter shall be made at least 30 days 
prior to the trial, unless good cause is shown why a disclosure should be 
denied, restricted, or deferred.  If the material and information becomes known 
to, or comes into the possession of, a party within 30 days of trial, disclosure 
shall be made immediately, unless good cause is shown why a disclosure 
should be denied, restricted, or deferred.  “Good cause” is limited to threats or 
possible danger to the safety of a victim of witness, possible loss or destruction 
of evidence, or possible compromise of other investigations by law 
enforcement. 
  Upon the request of any party, the court may permit a showing of good 
cause for the denial or regulation of disclosures, or any portion of that 
showing, to be made in camera.  A verbatim record shall be made of any such 
proceeding.  If the court enters an order granting relief following a showing in 
camera, the entire record of the showing shall be sealed and preserved in the 
records of the court, and shall be made available to an appellate court in the 
event of an appeal or writ.  In its discretion, the trial court may after trial and 
conviction, unseal an previously sealed matter. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.7 (West 1985 & Supp. 2002). 
 28. Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 207. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 206–07.  
 31. Id. at 208, 209 n.2. 
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Even though the trial court expressed concerns about the effect of its 
ruling and acknowledged that the defense would not be able to 
investigate the witnesses without knowing their names, the court 
nevertheless concluded that the three witnesses were “in danger and that 
disclosure of their names would increase the risk of possible danger to 
them.”32 
It should be noted that even though evidence established that one of 
the defendants, Alvarado, was involved in the intimidation of one of the 
three witnesses, the trial court named only the Mexican Mafia, and not 
any of the defendants, as the source of witness intimidation.33  This fact 
becomes extremely important when considering the People’s attempt to 
rely on the waiver by intimidation argument discussed later.34 
3.  The Discovery Problems 
The prosecution provided discovery to the defense which included the 
transcripts of the grand jury proceedings; information about the three 
witnesses’ custodial status; the module, row, and cell number of the 
three witnesses at the time of the homicide; the three witnesses’ prior 
criminal histories and police reports of their prior crimes; copies of 
interviews with other inmates; the names and photographs of thirty-three 
other inmates who were in the module where the killing occurred on that 
day; and the names of all inmates who were in a nearby county jail 
module.35  But the prosecution did not give the witnesses’ true names, 
nor their photographs to the defense.36   
The defense maintained that without knowing the witnesses’ 
identities, they would not be able to effectively cross-examine the 
witnesses at trial for the following reasons: 
[The defense] will be unable to determine whether the witnesses (1) were present at 
the time and place of the killing, (2) harbored grudges against either or both 
defendants, (3) had a motive to kill the victim themselves and accuse defendants in 
order to dispel suspicion from themselves, (4) made inconsistent statements to others 
regarding relevant aspects of the case, and (5) had reputations for dishonesty.37 
 
 32. Id. at 208. 
 33. See id. at 207–08, 209 n.2, 221 n.12. 
 34. See id. at 221 n.12. 
 35. Alvarado v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 4th 1121, 1128 n.2 (Cal. 2000) (reporting 
information that was deleted from the opinion published in the Pacific Reporter). 
 36. Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 207. 
 37. Id. at 221. 
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The California Supreme Court agreed with the defendants’ 
contentions.  It found that without the sought-after information, the 
defendants would be precluded from having information necessary for 
effective cross-examination.38 
For these reasons, the Alvarado court vacated the trial court’s order, 
which allowed the prosecution permanently to withhold the identity of 
its three witnesses from the defense.39  It further ordered the trial court to 
fashion a new order consistent with the court’s expressed conclusions, 
which could deny, restrict, or defer “disclosure of the identity of each 
witness before trial . . . as long as that order does not impermissibly 
impair defendants’ right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses 
effectively at trial.”40  Thus, assuming all circumstances are the same on 
remand, the identity of the witnesses must be given to the defendants at 
trial.41 
C. The Identity of Crucial Witnesses, Whose Credibility Is at Issue, 
Must Be Disclosed 
Without a doubt, the Alvarado decision is a narrow one, limited to 
those cases where credibility of crucial prosecution witnesses is at issue.  
As will be shown, this view is supported by the cases the court cited in 
its opinion, the factual nature of the case itself, and the express 
statements of the court. 
In reaching its decision, the California Supreme Court relied mainly 
on the Smith case.42  Not once, but twice, the court quoted the same 
passage from Smith to the effect that when credibility is the main issue, a 
witness may not testify anonymously: 
 
 38. The California Supreme Court quoted at length from the court of appeal 
opinion about the difficulties involved: 
[D]efense counsel “will have difficulty obtaining complete information about 
the witnesses’ location and ability to observe and testify about the crime[,] . . . 
[and] will be unable to [obtain] complete impeaching information, such as the 
witnesses’ reputation for truthfulness or dishonesty, previous history and 
accuracy of providing information to law enforcement, and other motives to 
fabricate, such as revenge or reduction or dismissal of their own charges.”  
Indeed, without access to either the witnesses’ names or their photographs, 
defense counsel are unlikely to be able to conduct an adequate investigation of 
the witnesses or of the veracity of their testimony, or challenge the accuracy of 
the information concerning the witnesses provided by the prosecution, including 
their prior criminal records or the benefits that may have been provided to them 
in return for their testimony. 
Id. (alteration in original). 
 39. See id. at 206, 221, 223. 
 40. Id. at 206. 
 41. See id. at 223. 
 42. See id. at 206, 215 & n.8, 220 n.11. 
FINALCASSANI2.DOC 2/4/2020  12:58 PM 
[VOL. 39:  1165, 2002]  The Waiver Doctrine After Alvarado 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1175 
[W]hen the credibility of a witness is in issue, the very starting point in 
‘exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth’ through cross-examination must 
necessarily be to ask the witness who he is and where he lives.  The witness’[s] 
name and address open countless avenues of in-court examination and out-of-
court investigation.  To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is 
effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself.43 
The thrust of the court’s analysis throughout its opinion was that 
withholding the identities of the prosecution’s witnesses, when the 
witnesses had current and prior criminal histories, possible motives to 
fabricate, and questionable credibility, violated a defendant’s right of 
confrontation.44 
The court emphasized that “[t]he main and essential purpose of 
confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-
examination.”45  Cross-examination is the principle mechanism by which 
the defense tests witness credibility and the truth of witness statements 
before the trier of fact.46  Cross-examination is used not only to test the 
witness’s memory and perceptions of what occurred, but also to impeach 
or discredit the witness’s testimony.47  One method used to impeach a 
witness is to confront him with the fact that he has a prior felony 
conviction,48 which can indicate dishonesty or “moral turpitude.”49  The 
 
 43. Id. at 205–06, 215 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 
129, 131 (1968)). 
 44. See supra note 7. 
[I]n every case in which the testimony of a witness has been found crucial to 
the prosecution’s case the courts have determined that it is improper at trial to 
withhold information (for example, the name or address of the witness) 
essential to the defendant’s ability to conduct an effective cross-examination. 
Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 219–20; see also id. at 220 n.11 (“Justice White’s concurring opinion 
in Smith did not suggest, however, that the testimony of a crucial witness could be 
admitted while withholding his or her identity, when nondisclosure of the witness’s 
identity would significantly impair the defendant’s ability to investigate and cross-
examine the witness.”). 
 45. Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 213 (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315–16 
(1974) (quoting J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395, at 123 (3d ed. 1940))).  
 46. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (“Cross-examination is the 
principle means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are 
tested.”). 
 47. Id. (“[T]he cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness’ 
story to test the witness’ perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has 
traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness.”). 
 48. California Evidence Code section 788 provides, in relevant part: “For the 
purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, it may be shown by the examination of 
the witness or by the record of the judgment that he has been convicted of a felony . . . .”  
CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002). 
 49. See People v. Castro, 696 P.2d 111, 119 (Cal. 1985) (“There is then some 
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theory is that one who has committed a felony that reflects a readiness to 
do evil is less likely than other witnesses to be telling the truth.50  By 
impeaching the witness with his prior felony conviction, the defense has 
afforded the trier of fact a basis that it may use to evaluate the witness’s 
credibility. 
Cross-examination is also used to reveal any “possible biases, 
prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly 
to issues” in the trial.51  Exploration of a witness’s bias may be used to 
show either that the witness’s testimony is not believable or, at the very 
least, that it must be carefully evaluated in light of that bias.52  A prison 
inmate may be motivated to provide information to the authorities in 
exchange for special treatment, such as reduction in sentence or 
prosecutorial immunity, or in response to the “coercive effect of his 
detention.”53  “[P]artiality of a witness is . . . ‘always relevant as 
discrediting the witness and [thus] affecting the weight of his 
testimony.’”54  Defense counsel may impeach a prison inmate by 
showing that, because of the witness’s current incarceration, the 
witness’s testimony was an attempt to curry favor with those in power in 
the prison or with the authorities, or even an attempt to draw suspicion 
away from himself.55  Exposing a witness’s motivation to testify is one 
of the proper and important functions of cross-examination.  In this way, 
it is possible to expose “facts from which [the] jurors, as the sole triers 
of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to 
 
basis . . . for inferring that a person who has committed a crime which involves moral 
turpitude other than dishonesty is more likely to be dishonest than a witness about whom 
no such thing is known.”). 
 50. See id. at 118.  The classic statement of the rationale for felony impeachment, 
written by Justice Holmes, is as follows: 
[W]hen it is proved that a witness has been convicted of crime, the only 
ground for disbelieving him which such proof affords is the general readiness 
to do evil which the conviction may be supposed to show.  It is from that 
general disposition alone that the jury is asked to infer a readiness to lie in a 
particular case, and thence that he has lied in fact.  The evidence has no 
tendency to prove that he was mistaken, but only that he has perjured himself, 
and it reaches that conclusion solely through the general proposition that he is 
of bad character and unworthy of credit. 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884)). 
 51. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316. 
 52. See id. at 319 (“Here, however, petitioner sought to introduce evidence of 
Green’s probation for the purpose of suggesting that Green was biased and, therefore, 
that his testimony was either not to be believed . . . or at least very carefully considered 
in that light.”). 
 53. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 693 (1931). 
 54. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316 (quoting 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 940, at 775 (rev. 
by James H. Chadbourn 1970)).   
 55. See Alford, 282 U.S. at 693. 
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the reliability of the witness,” and hence the truth of that testimony.56 
The witnesses in Alvarado were inmates in custody for violations of 
the law.  The discovery given to the defense disclosed that they each had 
criminal histories.57  If in fact any of the three witnesses were convicted 
of felonies, particularly felonies showing moral turpitude, these 
convictions would provide a basis for impeachment.58  Moreover, 
because the three inmates were convicts, their credibility automatically 
becomes one of the prime areas for the defense to explore.  Their status 
as convicts alone suggests that they might have testified before the grand 
jury in order to get favorable treatment for their current charges.  In the 
same vein, the defense would be obligated to investigate whether in the 
past they had testified for the prosecution, and, if so, whether they 
received a benefit in return.  Furthermore, the defense would want to 
explore whether any of the witnesses had worked for anyone in law 
enforcement in exchange for consideration.  All of these inquiries are 
proper areas for defense counsel to explore because of the witnesses’ 
status as current inmates with a criminal past. 
The Alvarado court determined that the defendants were entitled to 
know the identities of the prosecution’s witnesses, prison inmates whose 
credibility was at issue, in order to effectively cross-examine them.  The 
court did not address whether the issue of witness safety would ever 
weigh in favor of nondisclosure of witness identity.  As acknowledged 
by the court, neither of the two cases on which the court relied, Smith59 
and Alford,60 addressed the issue of witness safety.61  Indeed, the court 
emphasized that even Justice White, in his concurring opinion in Smith, 
did not argue that a witness’s identity should be withheld because of 
safety concerns when the witness’s credibility is a major issue.62  The 
court stated that its decision dealt only with “defendants’ legal claims 
 
 56. Davis, 415 U.S. at 318. 
 57. See Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 207, 220. 
 58. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002).   
 59. Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968). 
 60. Alford, 282 U.S. at 687. 
 61. Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 215–16 n.8 (“Neither Alford, nor Smith, addressed the 
question whether nondisclosure of a witness’s identity might be justified by a need to 
protect the safety of the witness.”  (citations omitted)). 
 62. See id. at 220 n.11 (“Justice White’s concurring opinion in Smith did not 
suggest, however, that the testimony of a crucial witness could be admitted while 
withholding his or her identity, when nondisclosure of the witness’s identity would 
significantly impair the defendant’s ability to investigate and cross-examine the 
witness.”).  
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regarding the propriety of the trial court’s nondisclosure order,” not with 
the issue of witness safety and witness intimidation.63 
Therefore, Alvarado held that a crucial witness’s identity must be 
disclosed to the defense “at trial” when the witness’s credibility is in 
issue.64  The fact that the safety of such witnesses has been compromised 
and endangered is not a factor in deciding whether the right of 
confrontation is violated by an order of nondisclosure.  The court 
concluded that when a crucial witness’s credibility is at issue, witness 
safety issues must be dealt with in ways that the law provides, such as 
witness protection programs.65  Under Alvarado, the identity of a 
witness, even one who has been threatened and attacked and whose life 
is in danger, must be disclosed to the defense at trial when all of the 
following factors are present: (1) the witness is crucial to the 
prosecution, (2) the witness’s credibility is at issue, (3) the ability to 
investigate the witness will be impeded without that information, and (4) 
the defense will be unable to effectively cross-examine the witness.66  
What Alvarado did not decide is whether a crucial witness’s identity 
may be withheld from the defense when the witness has been attacked or 
intimidated by the defendant or at his behest and the witness’s credibility 
is not in issue. 
Despite its limited application, Alvarado opens up numerous problems 
for both the prosecution and the defense.  Although Alvarado applies 
only to those crucial prosecution witnesses with credibility issues, one 
may predict that Alvarado will have a chilling effect on individuals 
reporting crimes or volunteering information about criminal activity to 
the police and prosecutors once they know that their identity cannot be 
shielded.  Furthermore, the decision likely will have a deterrent effect on 
the willingness of threatened witnesses to testify in criminal proceedings 
when they are informed  that the defense must know their identity.67  The 
long-range effect is that criminals can threaten, harass, and intimidate 
witnesses with impunity to the detriment of societal goals of prosecuting 
crime and deterring criminal activity. 
There are additional problems in interpreting what the phrase “at trial” 
means with respect to when identity disclosure must be given to the 
defense.68  Does that mean the day of pretrial motions, the first day of 
jury selection, the first day of testimony, or the day the witness in 
question testifies?  If “at trial” refers to the day the witness testifies, then 
 
 63. Id. at 222 n.14. 
 64. Id. at 223. 
 65. See id. at 222–23. 
 66. See supra note 7. 
 67. See infra notes 387–409 and accompanying text.   
 68. See Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 221–22. 
FINALCASSANI2.DOC 2/4/2020  12:58 PM 
[VOL. 39:  1165, 2002]  The Waiver Doctrine After Alvarado 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1179 
a number of logistical problems are presented for the defense.  The 
prospect of obtaining such information on the day of the witness’s 
testimony would most likely require a request for a continuance in order 
to adequately investigate the background of the witness. In turn, the 
question arises how one qualifies a jury when one does not know how 
long the investigation will take, if out-of-state witnesses might be 
required, or if necessary witnesses are unavailable at the time of trial.  
Furthermore, how does one voir dire a jury when one does not have all 
the information about the criminal case, and will not have this 
information until the investigation into all of the witnesses’ backgrounds 
are completed?  The investigation could lead to the necessity of further 
research, or the possibility of unexplored defenses.  All of these 
possibilities could result in serious logistical problems for the defense, 
possible mistrials, and delays for the trial courts. 
Still more problems are presented by the Alvarado court’s suggestion 
that witness protection programs are sufficient to assist threatened 
witnesses.69  These and other issues are discussed in this Article.  First, 
however, the nature and scope of the Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation and its historical origins must be addressed. 
III.  THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION 
A. Introduction 
In less than twenty words, the architects of our Constitution created 
one of our most important trial rights: the right of confrontation.  The 
Sixth Amendment grants to a criminal defendant the right to confront the 
witnesses at his trial: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”70 
Although the words used are simple terms, apparently easy to 
understand, a great deal of controversy and analysis has evolved as to 
their meaning.  Any attempt to interpret the Confrontation Clause must 
begin with the historical reasons for its existence.  Understanding its 
historical origin assists in determining the intended purpose of the 
Clause and, hence, its meaning.  Therefore, whether the Sixth 
Amendment requires disclosure of threatened unidentified material 
 
 69. See id. at 222–23. 
 70. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The Confrontation Clause is part of our Bill of Rights 
and is made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 406 (1965). 
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witnesses, whose credibility is not in issue, depends upon the following 
factors: what specific rights are included within the amendment, the 
scope of those rights, whether or not there are exceptions, and what 
constitutes a waiver of those rights.  To answer these questions, the 
historical origin of the Sixth Amendment will be discussed. 
B. The Historical Origin of the Confrontation Clause 
History reveals that the Confrontation Clause came into existence 
because of the legal abuses that occurred in criminal trials in England 
prior to the seventeenth century.  Its primary purpose was to prevent the 
trial of individuals based solely on accusations made anonymously or by 
the use of ex parte depositions or affidavits.71 
It is sufficient to note that the particular vice that gave impetus to the 
confrontation claim was the practice of trying defendants on “evidence” which 
consisted solely of ex parte affidavits or depositions secured by the examining 
magistrates, thus denying the defendant the opportunity to challenge his accuser 
in a face-to-face encounter in front of the trier of fact.72 
Around 1290, a group of English officials, known as the Privy 
Council, began advising the king and performing certain executive 
functions.  By the mid-fourteenth century, the Privy Council acted as a 
court, holding hearings at Westminster in a room ornamented with the 
king’s star-shaped seal.  The Privy Council came to be known as the 
Court of Star Chamber.73  It flourished in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries,74 and heard cases involving, among other things, 
the misuse of judicial power, perjury, contempt, and forgery.  
Punishment ranged from torture, imprisonment, and mutilation, to the 
imposition of a fine.75 
Defendants before the Star Chamber were required to have counsel, 
and the defendant’s answer to an indictment was not accepted unless 
signed by his counsel.  If counsel refused to sign the answer, the 
defendant was deemed to have confessed.76  If the defendant did provide 
an answer signed by his counsel, the court would then require the 
 
 71. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 362 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The 
Court consistently has indicated that the primary purpose of the [Confrontation] Clause 
was to prevent the abuses that had occurred in England.”). 
 72. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970); see also Mattox v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895) (“The primary object of the constitutional provision in 
question was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes 
admitted . . .  being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-
examination of the witness . . . .”).   
 73. United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1446 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 74. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975). 
 75. Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1446. 
 76. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821–22. 
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defendant to answer interrogatories submitted by his accuser.77  Refusal 
to answer any of the interrogatories would be met with a fine of twenty 
shillings.  If the defendant refused again, the fine would double and the 
defendant would be imprisoned until an answer was given.  A defendant 
could remain in prison indefinitely for a refusal to answer these 
questions.78 
Some authorities have stated that trials in the Star Chamber were 
public, but that witnesses against the accused were examined privately, 
with no opportunity given to the defendant to discredit them.79  The 
accused was questioned secretly, often tortured, in an effort to obtain a 
confession.80 
In 16th-century England, magistrates interrogated the prisoner, accomplices, and others 
prior to trial.  These interrogations were intended only for the information of the 
court.  The prisoner had no right to be, and probably never was, present.  At the 
trial itself, proof was usually given by reading depositions, confessions of 
accomplices, letters, and the like; and this occasioned frequent demands by the 
prisoner to have his ‘accusers,’ i.e., the witnesses against him, brought before 
him, face to face . . . .  There was . . . no appreciation at all of the necessity of 
calling a person to the stand as a witness”; rather, it was common practice to 
obtain “information by consulting informed persons not called into court.81    
After the Star Chamber ended, the notion of obligatory counsel 
disappeared—defendants were not represented by counsel in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England.82  Sir Walter Raleigh’s 
trial for treason was in 1603, and presumably he did not have counsel.83 
A crucial element of the evidence against [Raleigh] consisted of the statements 
of one Cobham, implicating Raleigh in a plot to seize the throne.84  Raleigh had 
 
 77. Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1446. 
 78. Id. at 1447. 
 79. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 361–62 (1992); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 
823–24 & n.21; California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156–58 & n.9 (1970); In re Oliver, 
333 U.S. 257, 269–70 & nn.21–22 (1948); Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1446–50; United States v. 
Cojab, 996 F.2d 1404, 1407 (2d Cir. 1993); Margaret A. Berger, The 
Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial 
Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 569–70 (1992).  
 80. Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270 n.22 (“Apparently all authorities agree that the accused 
himself was grilled in secret, often tortured, in an effort to obtain a confession . . . .”); see also 
White, 502 U.S. at 361; Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1446.   
 81. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 361 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotes omitted) (alteration in original). 
 82. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 823. 
 83. Green, 399 U.S. at 157 n.10. 
 84. Cobham confessed as well, but it was believed that his confession had been 
obtained by torture.  Id. at 157 n.22; White, 502 U.S. at 361–62. 
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since received a written retraction from Cobham, and believed that Cobham 
would now testify in his favor.  After a lengthy dispute over Raleigh’s right to 
have Cobham called as a witness, Cobham was not called, and Raleigh was 
convicted.85 
Around the middle of the seventeenth century when the Puritans left 
England for the American colonies, a national debate arose in England 
about the Star Chamber and the British monarchy.86  The trial of a 
tailor’s apprentice, John Lilburne, resulted in his writing and circulating 
a number of documents condemning the monarchy’s power.  Members 
of the English Parliament sympathized with these writings, and in 1641, 
the Star Chamber was abolished.87  The appellation “Star Chamber” has 
since become synonymous with abuses of people’s rights.88  Over a 
century later, in 1791, the Sixth Amendment was ratified.89 
C. The Rights to Cross-Examine and Physically Confront One’s 
Accusers Are Included in the Clause 
The historical origin of the Clause reveals that its purpose is to 
provide specific trial procedures to promote the reliability and the 
integrity of evidence presented in a criminal trial.90  The drafters 
particularly sought to prevent trials based on unreliable hearsay.  In 
contrast to the prior practice of trying defendants with evidence 
presented by unnamed witnesses and by written statements, without any 
opportunity to test that evidence, 91 it is submitted that the Clause 
 
 85. Green, 399 U.S. at 157 n.10. 
 86. See Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1449. 
 87. Id. at 1449–50; see e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948). 
 88. Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d 203, 214 n.7 (Cal. 2000) (citing Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975)). 
 89. See Oliver, 333 U.S. at 267.  The right to a public trial did not exist in this 
country until 1776.  See id. at 266–67. Prior to that time, a common law requirement 
of confrontation had developed.  See id. at 266–67 & n.14; White, 502 U.S. at 361–62 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 
(1926)).   
 90. See White, 502 U.S. at 356–57 (“[T]he Confrontation Clause has as a basic 
purpose the promotion of the ‘integrity of the factfinding process.’”); Ohio v. Roberts, 
448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (“[The] underlying purpose [of the Clause is] to augment 
accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test 
adverse evidence . . . .”).   
The decisions of this Court make it clear that the mission of the Confrontation 
Clause is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-
determining process in criminal trials by assuring that ‘the trier of fact [has] a 
satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement. 
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (alteration in original). 
 91. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970). 
[T]he particular vice that gave impetus to the [Confrontation Clause] was the 
practice of trying defendants on “evidence” which consisted solely of ex 
parte affidavits or depositions secured by the examining magistrates, thus 
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mandates several changes.  First, it prescribes the setting in which a 
criminal trial will proceed.  Second, it mandates preliminary 
requirements as to the admission of evidence.  And last, but most 
importantly, it provides certain rights to the accused.92 
As to the first level of protection, the Clause requires a trial set in a 
court of law, which is meant to impress on those present both the 
seriousness and solemnity of the proceedings.93  The second level of 
protection generally requires that the accused and the prosecution 
witnesses are present before the trier of fact.94  The trier of fact, the final 
determiner of what in fact occurred, is able to observe the demeanor of 
the witnesses as they testify, thus permitting a basis for assessing their 
credibility.95  The witness is compelled “to stand face to face with the 
jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon 
the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is 
worthy of belief.”96 
The witnesses, in turn, give their statements under oath, swear to tell 
the truth, and their testimony is then subjected to rigorous testing.97  The 
physical presence of the accused is meant to contribute to the reliability 
 
denying the defendant the opportunity to challenge his accuser in a face-to-face 
encounter in front of the trier of fact. 
Id. 
 92. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990) (stating that the purpose of 
the Confrontation Clause is served by “ensuring that evidence admitted against an 
accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial testing”); Lee v. Illinois, 476 
U.S. 530, 548 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that the Confrontation Clause 
advances the determination of truth “by assuring that the ‘trier of fact [has] a satisfactory 
basis for evaluating the truth of the [testimony]’” (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 
89 (1970))); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1985) (stating that “the Confrontation 
Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before 
the trier of fact”). 
 93. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 845–46. 
 94. See id. at 845.  As will be discussed, the presence of witnesses is not always 
required, because certain hearsay statements are admissible without a confrontation 
violation.  See e.g., Dutton, 400 U.S. at 80; Green, 399 U.S. at 153, 158.  Additionally, a 
defendant’s presence may be waived, either expressly or implicitly.  Diaz v. United 
States, 223 U.S. 442, 450–51 (1912).   
 95. Craig, 497 U.S. at 845–46 (1990). 
 96. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895). 
 97. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 846. 
The combined effect of these elements of confrontation—physical presence, 
oath, cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier of fact—
serves the purposes of the Confrontation Clause by ensuring that evidence 
admitted against an accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial 
testing that is the norm of Anglo-American criminal proceedings. 
Id. 
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of the evidence by bolstering the likelihood that witnesses will tell the 
truth.  Facing a defendant while testifying under oath impresses upon 
witnesses the seriousness of the matter and subjects witnesses to the 
penalty of perjury if they lie.98  It also acknowledges the truth of the 
maxim that it is harder to tell a lie to another’s face.99 
 The perception that confrontation is essential to fairness has persisted over 
the centuries because there is much truth to it.  A witness “may feel quite 
differently when he has to repeat his story looking at the man whom he will 
harm greatly by distorting or mistaking the facts. . . .”  It is always more 
difficult to tell a lie about a person “to his face” than “behind his back.”  In the 
former context, even if the lie is told, it will often be told less convincingly.  
The Confrontation Clause does not, of course, compel the witness to fix his eyes 
upon the defendant; he may studiously look elsewhere, but the trier of fact will 
draw its own conclusions.  Thus the right to face-to-face confrontation serves 
much the same purpose as a less explicit component of the Confrontation 
Clause . . . the right to cross-examine the accuser; both “ensur[e] the integrity of 
the factfinding process.”100 
Finally, the Clause provides a third level of protection by conferring 
upon the accused certain rights, whether characterized as explicit, 
implied, or collateral.101  No one will dispute that the Clause explicitly 
sets forth the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to confront his 
accusers face-to-face.102  What is disputed is whether and to what extent, 
if any, and under what circumstances, that the right of face-to-face 
confrontation may be outweighed by other concerns such as public 
policy,103 the necessities of the case,104 waiver,105 or hearsay 
objections.106  Because these other concerns do exist, and because the 
 
 98. See id. at 845–46. 
 99. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1018 (“The phrase still persists, ‘Look me in the eye and 
say that.’”). 
 100. Id. at 1019–20 (citations omitted) (alteration in original); see also Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 n.6 (1980) (noting that it is more difficult to lie against an 
accused who is present at trial). 
 101. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Confrontation Clause 
guarantees not only what it explicitly provides for—‘face-to-face’ confrontation—but 
also implied and collateral rights . . . .”). 
 102. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016 (“We have never doubted, therefore, that the 
Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses 
appearing before the trier of fact.”); id. at 1017 (“More recently, we have described the 
‘literal right to “confront” the witness at the time of trial’ as forming ‘the core of the 
values furthered by the Confrontation Clause.’” (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 
149, 157 (1970))). 
 103. See id. at 1021; Craig, 497 U.S. at 850; Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 
243 (1895). 
 104. Craig, 497 U.S. at 850; Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243. 
 105. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934); Diaz v. United States, 
223 U.S. 442, 450–51 (1912); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878). 
 106. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598 (1994); White v. Illinois, 
502 U.S. 346, 348–49 (1992); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 813–14 (1990); United 
States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 391 (1986); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 67–68 (1980); 
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scope and application of this right is not specified in the Clause, a literal 
interpretation has been rejected in favor of the view that facial 
confrontation is preferred, but not required.107  A literal interpretation of 
facial confrontation would result in the inadmissibility of all hearsay 
evidence, a result considered both unwarranted and extreme.108 
One might assume, given the historical reasons for the Clause and its 
specific language, that face-to-face confrontation would be the primary 
right conferred on defendants.  After all, it was the rejection of trial by 
anonymous, unsworn accusers, and trial by paper evidence, untested and 
unchallenged, without the accused knowing who his accusers were or 
seeing them in court, that gave rise to the enactment of the Clause.  
However, because the main purpose of the Clause is the advancement of 
reliable evidence, the Court’s current view is that cross-examination is 
the essential right conferred by the Sixth Amendment.109  “[T]he mission 
 
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970). 
 107. Craig, 497 U.S. at 849 (“‘[T]he Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for 
face-to-face confrontation at trial,’ a preference that ‘must occasionally give way to 
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.’” (citations omitted) 
(italics in original)); id. at 844 (“We have never held, however, that the Confrontation 
Clause guarantees criminal defendants the absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with 
witnesses against them at trial.”); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64 (“The Court, however, has 
recognized that competing interests, if ‘closely examined,’ may warrant dispensing with 
confrontation at trial.” (citation omitted)).  
For a spirited dissent and objections to this interpretation, see Justice Scalia’s dissent 
in Craig, wherein he summarized and critically concluded: 
This reasoning abstracts from the right to its purposes, and then eliminates the 
right.  It is wrong because the Confrontation Clause does not guarantee reliable 
evidence; it guarantees specific trial procedures that were thought to assure 
reliable evidence, undeniably among which was “face-to-face” confrontation.  
Whatever else it may mean in addition, the defendant’s constitutional right “to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him” means, always and everywhere, 
at least what it explicitly says: the “‘right to meet face to face all those who 
appear and give evidence at trial.’” 
Craig, 497 U.S. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).  
 108. Craig, 497 U.S. at 849 (“Given our hearsay cases, the word ‘confronted,’ as 
used in the Confrontation Clause, cannot simply mean face-to-face confrontation . . . .”); 
Dutton, 400 U.S. at 80 (“It is not argued, nor could it be, that the constitutional right to 
confrontation requires that no hearsay evidence can ever be introduced.”); Wright, 497 
U.S. at 813 (“From the earliest days of our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, we have 
consistently held that the Clause does not necessarily prohibit the admission of hearsay 
statements against a criminal defendant, even though the admission of such statements 
might be thought to violate the literal terms of the Clause.”); Bourjaily v. United States, 
483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987) (“While a literal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause 
could bar the use of any out-of-court statements when the declarant is unavailable, this 
Court has rejected that view as ‘unintended and too extreme.’”).  
 109. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 845. 
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of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for the 
accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials by assuring 
that ‘the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth [of 
the witness’s testimony].’”110  Through cross-examination, this mission 
is accomplished. 
Cross-examination is permitted not only to explore the witness’s 
account of the events, but also to test the witness’s perception and 
memory, and to impeach or discredit the witness.111  Through cross-
examination, it is possible to show that a witness is biased, or that the 
testimony is exaggerated or not believable.112  Moreover, a witness’s 
expectation of leniency on a pending criminal case in exchange for his 
testimony, or even for immunity from prosecution, are proper areas 
subject to cross-examination.113  When the prosecution’s case depends 
upon “testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or 
who . . . [might be] motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, 
prejudice, . . . jealousy,” or revenge, cross-examination is available to 
expose those biases and infirmities.114 
Cross-examination is also available to identify the witness “with his 
community so that independent testimony may be sought and offered of 
his reputation for veracity in his own neighborhood” for purposes of 
 
The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of 
the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in 
the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.  The word 
“confront,” after all, also means a clashing of forces or ideas, thus carrying 
with it the notion of adversariness. 
Id.  “Although face-to-face confrontation forms ‘the core of the values furthered by the 
Confrontation Clause’ we have nevertheless recognized that it is not the sine qua non of 
the confrontation right.”  Id. at 847 (citation omitted).  “[T]he Confrontation Clause is 
generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and 
expose [testimonial] infirmities . . . through cross-examination . . . .”  Id.  (alteration in 
original) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985)).  “The main and 
essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-
examination.”  Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19–20 (1985) (quoting 5 J. 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395, at 123 (3d ed. 1940)).  “The Court has emphasized that the 
Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial, and that 
‘a primary interest secured by [the provision] is the right of cross-examination.’”  
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Douglas v. 
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)).    
 110. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89 (second alteration in original) (quoting California v. 
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)); see also Inadi, 475 U.S. at 396 (stating that the 
“Confrontation Clause’s very mission . . . is to advance the accuracy of the truth 
determining process in criminal trials” (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Tennessee v. 
Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985) (quoting Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89))).   
 111. See Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 19; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 71.   
 112. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51–52 (1987). 
 113. See Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 693 (1931). 
 114. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959). 
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impeachment or bias.115  Because it is unknown in advance what 
responses will actually be obtained, wide latitude is given in cross-
examination.116  But that latitude is not without limits.  Although an 
accused has a right to cross-examination, the trial court also has a duty to 
protect a witness from questions that go beyond the scope of proper 
cross-examination, such as questions intended to harass, annoy, or 
humiliate a witness.117 Moreover, “inquiries which tend to endanger the 
personal safety of the witness,”118 upon a proper showing, are considered 
improper.119 
Many of the cases that deal with Sixth Amendment confrontation 
involve improper limitations on the scope of cross-examination.120  
However, “[c]ross-examination is not improperly curtailed if the jury is 
in possession of facts sufficient to make a ‘discriminating appraisal’ of 
the particular witness’s credibility.”121  Indeed, a defendant’s right to 
cross-examination is not without limits.  “Defendants cannot run 
roughshod, doing precisely as they please simply because cross-
examination is underway.  So long as a reasonably complete picture of 
the witness’s veracity, bias, and motivation is developed, [the trial court 
has the] power and discretion to set appropriate boundaries.”122  
Nevertheless, when credibility is in issue, cross-examination may be 
used to inquire into the witness’s background, identity, and community.123  
But even under these circumstances, there is no fixed rule, and 
disclosure will depend on the particular case, balancing the public 
 
 115. Alford, 282 U.S. at 691. 
 116. Id. at 692. 
 117. Id. at 694. 
 118. Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 133–34 (1968) (White, J., concurring). 
 119. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (“[T]rial judges retain 
wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable 
limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, 
harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, [and] the witness’ safety . . . .”). 
 120. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988). 
 121. United States v. Sasso, 59 F.3d 341, 347 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting United States 
v. Roldan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795, 806 (2d Cir. 1940) (quoting United States v. Singh, 628 
F.2d 758, 763 (2d Cir. 1980))).   
 122. United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 254 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 123. See Smith, 390 U.S. at 131 (“Yet when the credibility of a witness is in issue, 
the very starting point in ‘exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth’ through cross-
examination must necessarily be to ask the witness who he is and where he lives.” 
(footnote omitted)); Alford, 282 U.S. at 692 (“Prejudice ensues from a denial of the 
opportunity to place the witness in his proper setting and put the weight of his testimony 
and his credibility to a test, without which the jury cannot fairly appraise them.”). 
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interest in nondisclosure against the defendant’s interest.124  This is so 
even when there is a material witness and credibility is in issue, because 
other considerations, such as witness safety, may have an impact on the 
disclosure of the witness’s identity.125  This subject is dealt with in 
depth, as is the subject of waiver, in another Part.126  At this point, it is 
sufficient to note that confrontation rights may be limited by trial 
judges127 and public policy concerns,128 and may be waived by a 
defendant expressly,129 or by misconduct.130 
D. The Right of Confrontation Is Not Absolute 
Our society places a high value on human life and liberty, which is 
reflected in the many protections provided to defendants in criminal 
trials.131  Those accused of crimes and those who prosecute crimes are 
not on equal footing.  The government not only has the power of 
indictment, but also extensive resources for investigators, experts, and 
other costs associated with criminal proceedings, that far exceed those 
available to individuals accused of crimes.132  Many of the protections of 
the Bill of Rights attempt to equalize the advantages between these two 
 
 124. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957). 
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable.  The 
problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow 
of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense.  Whether a 
proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular 
circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the 
possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and 
other relevant factors. 
Id.  See also McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311 (1967) (“What Roviaro thus makes 
clear is that this Court was unwilling to impose any absolute rule requiring disclosure of 
an informer’s identity even in formulating evidentiary rules for federal criminal trials.”). 
 125. See Smith, 390 U.S. at 133 (“There is a duty to protect [a witness] from 
questions which go beyond the bounds of proper cross-examination merely to harass, 
annoy or humiliate him . . . .” (quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694 
(1931))); id. at 133–34 (White, J., concurring) (“I would place in the same category those 
inquiries which tend to endanger the personal safety of the witness.”); Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (“On the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude 
insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such 
cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, [and] the witness’ safety . . . .”).    
 126. See infra Parts IV–V.  
 127. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. 
 128. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844–45 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 
1012, 1020–21 (1988) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (citing Mattox v. 
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895))). 
 129. See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936–37 (1991); Diaz v. United 
States, 223 U.S. 442, 452–53 (1912). 
 130. See Diaz, 223 U.S. at 452; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878). 
 131. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–62 (1970). 
 132. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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parties in criminal prosecutions.133  These protections, such as the right 
of confrontation and the right to counsel, are intended to promote the 
integrity of the adversary process, the search for truth, and the assurance 
of a fair trial. 
“Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when 
criminal trials are fair.”134  While it is true that “[t]he dual aim of our 
criminal justice system is ‘that guilt shall not escape nor innocence 
suffer,’”135 various protections ensure that the system’s aim is not 
achieved at the expense of fairness.  A fair trial fosters confidence in the 
criminal system and in our government.  In search of truth, criminal 
trials must preserve the integrity of the adversary process by fostering 
procedures that promote the presentation of reliable evidence and reject 
unreliable evidence.136 
The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded 
on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts.  The very integrity of the 
judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of 
all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence.137 
 The integrity of the adversary process is also promoted by the 
requirement that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.138  The 
principle that “it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let the 
guilty man go free” is reflected by this standard of proof.139  The 
standard further protects the integrity of criminal trials by shifting the 
burden of persuasion to the government, reducing the risk that 
convictions will be based on factual error, and impressing upon the trier 
of fact the importance of achieving a state of subjective certainty 
regarding the facts. 140 
The Confrontation Clause also protects the integrity of the adversary 
process.  As part of the Bill of Rights, the Confrontation Clause grants a 
fundamental right to the accused, which may be used as a shield to protect 
the accused from potential government abuses, or used as a sword to 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 135. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975) (quoting Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). 
 136. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414–15 (1988). 
 137. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974). 
 138. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–64 (1970). 
 139. Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 140. Id. at 364 (quoting Norman Dorsen & Daniel A. Rezneck, In Re Gault and the 
Future of Juvenile Law, FAM. L.Q., Dec. 1967, at 1, 26). 
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expose error and untruth.141  Confrontation and cross-examination are 
“important where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals 
whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or 
persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or 
jealousy.”142  Used as a weapon, cross-examination can expose a witness’s 
prejudice, bias, or ulterior motivation to lie;143 expose falsehoods;144 test a 
witness’s ability to perceive and to remember; impeach;145 or “probe and 
expose . . . [infirmities], thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder 
the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness’ testimony.”146  Cross-
examination thus “minimizes the risk that a judgment will be predicated 
on incomplete, misleading, or even deliberately fabricated testimony.”147  
A “jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness 
may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle 
factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a 
defendant’s life or liberty may depend.”148  Moreover, the right of 
confrontation acts as a shield that “prevent[s] [constitutionally] improper 
restrictions on the types of questions that defense counsel may ask 
during cross-examination.”149 
However, the rights under the Confrontation Clause may be forfeited, 
waived, or limited by the trial court, just as with any other constitutional 
right.150  The privilege may be lost by consent, by an express or implied 
waiver, by conduct, or by misconduct.151  Additionally, “the ‘necessities 
of trial and the adversary process’ [may] limit the manner in which Sixth 
Amendment rights may be exercised, and limit the scope of Sixth 
Amendment guarantees.”152  For example, the right to confront witnesses 
is not the right to confront them in a way that disrupts the trial,153 and the 
right to assistance of counsel does not include the right to consult with 
 
 141. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965). 
 142. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959). 
 143. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). 
 144. See Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404. 
 145. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19 (1985). 
 146. Id. at 22. 
 147. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 411–12 (1988). 
 148. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). 
 149. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 (1987). 
 150. See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991) (“The most basic rights 
of criminal defendants are . . . subject to waiver.”). 
 151. See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 450 (1912) (“[T]he right of 
confrontation . . . is in the nature of a privilege extended to the accused . . . and that he is 
free to assert it or to waive it . . . .” (citation omitted)); id. at 452 (“The view that this 
right may be waived also was recognized by this court in Reynolds v. United 
States . . . .”).   
 152. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 863 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 153. Id. at 864. 
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counsel at all times during the trial.154  Additionally, an accused does not 
have an unrestrained right to offer testimony that is untrue, incomplete, 
privileged, or otherwise inadmissible.155  Like the prosecution, the 
accused must comply with rules of procedure and evidence.156  
Moreover, “the Confrontation Clause [only] guarantees ‘an opportunity 
for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective 
in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’”157  In 
fact, because the Clause has nothing to do with discovery in criminal 
trials, the fact that some information was not disclosed which would 
have made cross-examination more effective is not a violation of that 
right.158  Thus, reasonable limitations by a trial judge on the bounds of 
cross-examination are not violations of the Sixth Amendment.159  A trial 
judge may properly limit cross-examination because of concerns about 
“harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or 
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”160  The 
appropriate extent and scope of cross-examination within constitutional 
limits are open questions.161 
In addition to limitations made by a trial court, the right is also subject 
to exceptions such as recognized hearsay exceptions.  The exact number 
of these exceptions has not been delineated, and, in fact, may be 
enlarged.162  The danger inherent in hearsay statements is that they may 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988); United States v. Nobles, 422 
U.S. 225, 241 (1975). 
 156. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). 
 157. Delaware v. Fensterer, 477 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam). 
 158. Failure to disclose information that might have made cross-examination more 
effective does not undermine the purpose of the Confrontation Clause.  Indeed, the 
Confrontation Clause has nothing to say about discovery.  See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 
480 U.S. 39, 52–53 (1987).  “The ability to question adverse witnesses, however, does 
not include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that 
might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony.”  Id. at 53 (footnote omitted). 
 159. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); id. at 685 (White, J., 
concurring). 
 160. Id. at 679. 
 161. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988). 
[M]ost of this Court’s encounters with the Confrontation Clause have involved 
either the admissibility of out-of-court statements . . . or restrictions on the 
scope of cross-examination . . . . The reason for that is not . . . that these 
elements are the essence of the Clause’s protection—but rather, quite the 
contrary, that there is at least some room for doubt . . . as to the extent to which 
the Clause includes those elements . . . . 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 162. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934) (“The exceptions are not . . . 
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have been made under circumstances subject to none of the protections 
afforded by the Sixth Amendment, such as cross-examination, oath, or 
facial confrontation, and may thus be unreliable.  Hearsay rules were 
developed with a view that the probability of truth is favored in certain 
extrajudicial statements because of the circumstances under which they 
were uttered.163  The reasons for favoring its truthfulness vary, and may 
include common sense notions, such as that people tend to tell the truth 
when dying164 or when testifying under oath.165 
Because the fundamental aim of the Clause is to promote the integrity 
of the fact-finding process, exceptions under the hearsay rules, when 
they are firmly rooted and have sufficient indicia of reliability, do not 
violate that right.166  Such hearsay exceptions include, among others, 
spontaneous declarations,167 statements made in the course of medical 
treatment,168 prior testimony,169 a co-conspirator’s statement,170 and 
dying declarations.171  As stated earlier, the test for admissibility is 
whether there are substantial guarantees of the trustworthiness of the 
statement and of the credibility of the declarant which overcome the 
hearsay status of the evidence.172  The hearsay nature of the statements 
involves the fact that they were made while the declarant was not under 
oath, outside the courtroom, and not before the trier of fact who, thus, 
could not observe the person’s demeanor at the time the statement was 
uttered.173 
Two examples of firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions will demonstrate 
 
static, but may be enlarged from time to time if there is no material departure from the 
reason of the general rule.”).   
 163. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994); Idaho v. Wright, 497 
U.S. 805, 813–16 (1990); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980); Dutton v. Evans, 
400 U.S. 74, 88 (1970); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 164. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1242 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002) (dying declarations). 
 165. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1290–1294 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002) (prior 
testimony). 
 166. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 & n.8 (1992).  “We note first that the 
evidentiary rationale for permitting hearsay testimony regarding spontaneous 
declarations and statements made in the course of receiving medical care is that such out-
of-court declarations are made in contexts that provide substantial guarantees of their 
trustworthiness.”  Id. at 358 (footnote omitted).  “‘[F]irmly rooted’ exceptions carry 
sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the reliability requirement posed by the 
Confrontation Clause.”  Id. at 355 n.8. 
 167. See id. at 355–56. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970).   
 170. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 79, 81 (1970); United States v. Inadi, 475 
U.S. 387, 400 (1986).   
 171. See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892). 
 172. See White, 502 U.S. at 355 & n.8. 
 173. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994); Idaho v. Wright, 497 
U.S. 805, 813–16 (1990); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980); Dutton v. Evans, 
400 U.S. 74, 88 (1970); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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why certain statements are inherently reliable.  The rationale for permitting 
hearsay testimony regarding statements made while receiving medical 
care, is that “such out-of-court declarations are made in contexts that 
provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness.”174  In this case, 
“the declarant knows that a false statement may cause misdiagnosis or 
mistreatment,”175 and it is unlikely that an individual would tell a lie 
under such circumstances.  Likewise, spontaneous declarations,176 statements 
made while the declarant is excited or under stress, are considered reliable 
since it is assumed that the declaration was made without the opportunity 
to reflect or contrive.177  The very circumstances under which the statement 
was uttered are its imprimatur of veracity.  Thus, in these circumstances, 
further scrutiny would be superfluous and adversary testing would add 
little or nothing to the statement’s reliability.178  Further, even those 
extrajudicial statements that do not come within a firmly-rooted exception, 
and thus, presumptively do not have indicia of reliability for purposes of 
the Confrontation Clause, may nonetheless meet those criteria if supported 
by a sufficient showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.179 
As shown, the right to confrontation is not absolute and may give way 
to other important considerations or interests.180  In addition to the 
exceptions already noted, limitation by the trial judge and hearsay rule 
exceptions, the right may give way to considerations of public policy or 
the necessities of the case.  Before such considerations are explored, 
however, the subject of witness intimidation, both its nature and impact, 
must be addressed. 
 
 174. White, 502 U.S. at 355. 
[S]tatements made by the victim to medical personnel for the purposes of 
medical diagnosis or treatment including descriptions of the cause of symptom, 
pain or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external 
source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment shall be 
admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule. 
Id. at  351 n.2; see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1250 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002).  
 175. White, 502 U.S. at 356. 
 176. California Evidence Code section 1240 provides: “Evidence of a statement is 
not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: (a) Purports to narrate, 
describe, or explain an act, condition or event perceived by the declarant; and (b) Was 
made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by 
such perception.”  CAL. EVID. CODE § 1240 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002). 
 177. See White, 502 U.S. at 356. 
 178. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820–21 (1990). 
 179. See id. at 817. 
 180. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 
(1980); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973); Mattox v. United States, 156 
U.S. 237, 243 (1895). 
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IV. WITNESS INTIMIDATION  
A. The Nature of Witness Intimidation 
1.  Introduction 
Witness intimidation has a profound and serious impact on the ability 
of government to enforce its laws and on society’s confidence in the 
ability of government to protect its citizens. By depriving crime 
investigators and prosecutors of critical evidence, witness intimidation 
undermines the criminal justice system’s ability to protect its citizens 
and ultimately undermines the confidence citizens have in their 
government.181  Courts have acknowledged “the serious nature and 
magnitude of the problem of witness intimidation,” and that government 
must provide protection to its witnesses.182  Because the most important 
factor in determining whether a case will be solved is the information 
supplied by the victim to the police, failure to address witness 
intimidation will lead to the loss of crucial evidence needed by 
investigators.183  The California State Legislature has recognized the 
important and integral part that crime witnesses play in the criminal 
justice system: 
 In recognition of the civil and moral duty of victims and witnesses of crime 
to fully and voluntarily cooperate with law enforcement and prosecutorial 
agencies, and in further recognition of the continuing importance of this citizen 
cooperation to state and local law enforcement efforts and the general 
effectiveness and well-being of the criminal justice system of this state, the 
Legislature declares its intent, in the enactment of this title, to ensure that all 
victims and witnesses of crime are treated with dignity, respect, courtesy, and 
sensitivity.  It is the further intent that the rights enumerated in Section 679.02 
relating to victims and witnesses of crime are honored and protected by law 
enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and judges in a manner no less vigorous 
than the protections afforded criminal defendants.184 
Witness intimidation may frighten eyewitnesses to a crime to the 
point that they will not come forward and provide crucial evidence to 
the police and investigators.  Or, witnesses may be so terrified 
because of intimidation that they refuse to testify.  Or, witness 
intimidation may result in the disappearance or elimination of a 
witness to prevent him or her from testifying at a defendant’s trial.  In 
each instance, the criminal justice system, society, and public safety 
 
 181. PETER FINN & KERRY MURPHY HEALEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PREVENTING 
GANG- AND DRUG-RELATED WITNESS INTIMIDATION 1 (1996). 
 182. Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d 203, 222 (Cal. 2000). 
 183. JULIE ESSELMAN TOMZ & DANIEL MCGILLIS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SERVING 
CRIME VICTIMS AND WITNESSES 2 (2d ed. 1997). 
 184. CAL. PENAL CODE § 679 (West 1999). 
FINALCASSANI2.DOC 2/4/2020  12:58 PM 
[VOL. 39:  1165, 2002]  The Waiver Doctrine After Alvarado 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1195 
suffer.185  Each situation prevents the prosecution of crimes, allows 
those who are guilty of crimes to remain free and go unpunished, and 
frustrates law enforcement personnel and prosecutors.186  Finally, 
instances of witness intimidation create the perception that the law 
cannot protect its citizens and thereby undermines public confidence in 
the police and government.187  If individuals believe that they cannot be 
adequately protected, they are less likely to cooperate with the police, 
which in turn impedes the ability of the police to gather evidence in 
attempt to stop criminal behavior.  Thus, the cycle is vicious and 
invidious. 
Even though the United States Department of Justice has conducted 
surveys about witness intimidation, the results of which indicate that it is 
increasing and widespread, the Department acknowledged that the exact 
extent of intimidation is unknown.188  Before discussing these surveys, 
the nature of witness intimidation, both community intimidation and 
direct intimidation, will be addressed. 
2. Community Intimidation 
Community intimidation exists in neighborhoods with criminal street 
gangs.  Attempts by gangs or drug dealers to promote community-wide 
noncooperation may include the public humiliation, assault, or even 
execution of victims or witnesses, or members of their families, as well 
as public acts of extreme brutality that are meant to terrify potential 
witnesses.  Even though there may not be an express threat of harm 
addressed to any particular individual, intimidation felt by the 
neighborhood inhabitants is just as real.189  Those who live in the area 
know that certain identified gangs claim the area as their “turf.”190  The 
residents have seen criminal acts and witnessed acts of retaliation 
sufficient for them to believe that the same sort of harm would come to 
them if any statements were given to law enforcement concerning any 
witnessed criminal activity.191  Community intimidation is characterized 
 
 185. See People v. Weidert, 705 P.2d 380, 394 (Cal. 1985) (Lucas, J., concurring 
and dissenting).  
 186. See FINN & HEALEY, supra note 181, at vii. 
 187. See id. at 2. 
 188. Id. at 4. 
 189. See id. at xi, 2, 5. 
 190. See People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 718 (Cal. 1996); People ex rel. Gallo v. 
Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 601 (Cal. 1997).   
 191. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 601–02, 613–14.  
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by an atmosphere of fear and noncooperation with the police.  It is 
generated by a history of community members witnessing incidents of 
gang violence, crimes, and retaliation against cooperating witnesses.192  
Each instance of witness intimidation by gang violence or threat of 
violence reinforces the perception that cooperation with the criminal 
justice system is dangerous.193 
Because penalties for witness tampering, suborning perjury, and 
obstruction of justice are slight in comparison to penalties for violent 
crimes such as murder, defendants accused of serious violent crimes 
may feel that they have little to lose and much to gain from witness 
intimidation.194  Gang members use intimidation and violence to subdue 
any perceived challenge to their authority.  Disputes or arguments with 
those outside the gang are settled through the use of violence, even 
murder.  Others in the neighborhood are terrorized by the threat of such 
retaliation, and this fear allows the gangs to continue their criminal 
activity.195  Often, the police and prosecutors must resort to relying on 
incarcerated witnesses or other felons for testimony in gang cases.196  
Even when gang members are placed behind bars, neighborhood citizens 
feel no relief from community intimidation.  The threat of retaliation 
from gang members who return after serving only brief sentences or who 
arrange for others to get to or threaten them remains.197  Because it is 
well-known that incarcerated gang members maintain uninterrupted 
communication with gang members outside of prison, the threat of 
retaliation against witnesses continues despite a defendant’s imprisonment 
pending trial, or even after conviction.198 
A good example of community intimidation by a gang is set forth in 
People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna.199  The community was Rocksprings in 
San Jose, California, and the court described the situation as follows: 
 The 48 declarations submitted by the City in support of its plea for 
injunctive relief paint a graphic portrait of life in the community of 
Rocksprings.  Rocksprings is an urban war zone.  The four-square-block 
neighborhood, claimed as the turf of a gang variously known as Varrio Sureño 
Town, Varrio Sureño Treces (VST), or Varrio Sureño Locos (VSL), is an 
occupied territory.  Gang members, all of whom live elsewhere, congregate on 
lawns, on sidewalks, and in front of apartment complexes at all hours of the day 
and night.  They display a casual contempt for notions of law, order, and 
decency—openly drinking, smoking dope, sniffing toluene, and even snorting 
 
 192. See FINN & HEALEY, supra note 181, at 2. 
 193. See id. 
 194. Id. at 79. 
 195. See Gardeley, 927 P.2d at 718. 
 196. FINN & HEALEY, supra note 181, at 4. 
 197. Id. at 2. 
 198. Id. 
 199. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997).  
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cocaine laid out in neat lines on the hoods of residents’ cars.  The people who 
live in Rocksprings are subjected to loud talk, loud music, vulgarity, profanity, 
brutality, fistfights and the sound of gunfire echoing in the streets.  Gang 
members take over sidewalks, driveways, carports, apartment parking areas, and 
impede traffic on the public thoroughfares to conduct their drive-up drug 
bazaar.  Murder, attempted murder, drive-by shootings, assault and battery, 
vandalism, arson, and theft are commonplace.  The community has become a 
staging area for gang-related violence and a dumping ground for the weapons 
and instrumentalities of crime once the deed is done.  Area residents have had 
their garages used as urinals; their homes commandeered as escape routes; their 
walls, fences, garage doors, sidewalks, and even their vehicles turned into a 
sullen canvas of gang graffiti. 
 The people of this community are prisoners in their own homes.  Violence 
and the threat of violence are constant.  Residents remain indoors, especially at 
night.  They do not allow their children to play outside.  Strangers wearing the 
wrong color clothing are at risk.  Relatives and friends refuse to visit.  The laundry 
rooms, the trash dumpsters, the residents’ vehicles, and their parking spaces are 
used to deal and stash drugs.  Verbal harassment, physical intimidation, threats of 
retaliation, and retaliation are the likely fate of anyone who complains of the 
gang’s illegal activities or tells police where drugs may be hidden.200 
Recognition of this dire situation is also reflected in the enactment of a 
California statute called the “STEP Act,” a euphemism for the California 
Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, passed in 1988.201  The 
preamble provides: 
 The Legislature, however, further finds that the State of California is in a state 
of crisis which has been caused by violent street gangs whose members threaten, 
terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes against the peaceful citizens of their 
neighborhoods.  These activities, both individually and collectively, present a 
clear and present danger to public order and safety and are not constitutionally 
protected.  The Legislature finds that there are nearly 600 criminal street gangs 
operating in California, and that the number of gang-related murders is increasing.  
The Legislature also finds that in Los Angeles County alone there were 328 gang-
related murders in 1986, and that gang homicides in 1987 have increased 80 
percent over 1986.  It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to 
seek the eradication of criminal activity by street gangs by focusing upon patterns 
of criminal gang activity and upon the organized nature of street gangs, which 
together, are the chief source of terror created by street gangs.  The Legislature 
further finds that an effective means of punishing and deterring the criminal 
activities of street gangs is through forfeiture of the profits, proceeds, and 
instrumentalities acquired, accumulated, or used by street gangs.202 
The sad fact is that a community’s perception that the criminal justice 
system cannot protect its citizens destroys the ability of police and 
 
 200. Id. at 601–02.  
 201. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.20–186.28 (West 1999 & Supp. 2002).  
 202. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (West 1999 & Supp. 2002). 
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prosecutors to do their job as effectively as any specific threat.203 
3. Direct Intimidation 
In addition to community intimidation, the criminal defendant may 
directly intimidate a witness.  Direct intimidation involves a threat 
communicated in some manner to a witness, or an actual physical assault 
on the witness.  The threat is communicated either by the defendant, or 
those close to him, either at his direction or with his consent, and is 
intended to cause the witness not to testify or to change his or her 
testimony to benefit the defendant.  Any physical assault is intended to 
have the same effect on the witness.204 
Such intimidation can take many forms, such as physical violence or 
threats of physical violence against the witness or a member of the 
witness’s family.205  Particularly effective are threats of physical 
violence against a witness’s mother, children, or spouse.  Threats may be 
communicated by drive-by shootings into the witness’s home, fire 
bombings of cars, house burnings, or any other form of violent activity.  
Intimidation may also involve explicit threats of murder.206 
In 1994, then-assistant U.S. district attorney for the District of 
Columbia expressed what he believed to be the reasons for the increase 
in witness intimidation: 
 In my view the reasons for this dramatic increase in fear and intimidation 
are many and varied.  The defendants we prosecute for committing violent 
crime are not only much younger than in the past, but they very often display 
several commonly held attitudes and beliefs, including a profound lack of 
respect for authority[;] the expectation that their own lives will be brief or will 
be lived out in prison[;] a sense of powerlessness and social inadequacy that can 
lead to the formation of gangs or neighborhood crews[;] the ready availability of 
very powerful firearms[;] a willingness to use those firearms for almost no 
reason or in retaliation for the most minimal slight to their extraordinarily 
fragile egos[;] and lastly, and ironically, the increased penalties being imposed 
on those convicted of violent crime, which can raise the stakes of a 
prosecution.207 
Intimidation may occur inside the courtroom or outside the 
courthouse.208 It may involve the defendant, his relatives, or his 
associates.  Inside the courtroom, for example, the defendant’s friends 
or relatives may stare or gesture at a witness in a threatening manner 
 
 203. FINN & HEALEY, supra note 181, at 2. 
 204. See id. at 1–10; NEXT MILLENIUM, supra note 15, at 1 (stating that “[w]itnesses 
are being intimidated and threatened by gang members to keep them from testifying”). 
 205. FINN & HEALEY, supra note 181, at 5–7. 
 206. See id. at 1–2. 
 207. Id. at 6. 
 208. See, e.g., People v. Lybrand, 171 Cal. Rptr. 157, 162 (Ct. App. 1981). 
FINALCASSANI2.DOC 2/4/2020  12:58 PM 
[VOL. 39:  1165, 2002]  The Waiver Doctrine After Alvarado 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1199 
while the witness is in the courthouse or courtroom.  Another particularly 
effective form of intimidation occurs when gang members pack the 
courtroom to demonstrate their solidarity with the defendant.  These 
gang members often wear black to symbolize death, stare at the witness 
intently, or use threatening hand signals.209  Defendants also manipulate 
the penal system to procure the intimidation of witnesses.  Defendants 
have access to information obtained by their defense attorneys from 
prosecutors during discovery.  In some jurisdictions where prisoners have 
unmonitored phone use and unscreened correspondence, defendants can 
use this information to arrange witness intimidation by those outside of 
prison.  Some gangs have even hired defense attorneys for witnesses in 
custody for related or unrelated crimes without the witnesses’ 
knowledge or consent in an effort to control their testimony.210  Other 
examples of intimidation in courtroom settings have been memorialized 
in published cases. 
In one case, as the witness stepped down from the stand after 
testifying, the defendant made a throat slitting gesture directed at the 
witness.  The witness burst out, “What the hell did that mean?  He’s over 
there going like this—excuse me, your Honor.”  The trial judge 
permitted the witness to retake the witness stand and testify and describe 
to the jury what had occurred.  On appeal, the court found that the trial 
judge did not err, because the evidence was admissible and relevant as to 
the defendant’s consciousness of guilt.211 
An infamous case of courtroom intimidation involved Charles Manson 
and his followers, Patricia Krenwinkel and Susan Atkins.212 Linda 
Kasabian, another devotee of Manson’s, had been charged as well, but 
was granted immunity and testified as a witness for the prosecution.213 
As she testified, Manson stared at her, and “took his right index finger 
from right to left and made a motion across the bottom [of] his chin from 
right to left,”214 simulating the slitting of a throat.215 
Courtroom intimidation may also involve friends or relatives of the 
defendant.  The victim in a sex case had been warned by the defendant 
 
 209. FINN & HEALEY, supra note 181, at 7. 
 210. Id. 
 211. People v. Foster, 246 Cal. Rptr. 855, 857 (Ct. App. 1988). 
 212. See People v. Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265, 276–77 (Ct. App. 1976).  
 213. Id. at 281.  
 214. Id. at 296 (alteration in original) (quoting Sergeant Gutierrez of the Los 
Angeles Police Department, who observed Manson’s threatening behavior at the trial). 
 215. Id. at 296 n.40. 
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that she should never tell the police what happened because “he had a lot 
of bad friends.”216 As she was about to leave the courthouse after the 
preliminary hearing, she saw three men who had been in the courtroom 
at the time of her testimony leaning against the hood of her parked car.  
One man was the defendant’s father and one was his brother.  She had 
also received threatening telephone calls from a man who identified 
himself as a friend of the defendant warning her not to testify.217 
In another case, three different witnesses gave statements to the police 
and identified the defendant, who was on trial for murder, as the 
individual who shot the victim.  By the time of the trial, however, all 
three witnesses were reluctant to testify.218  Each of the witnesses either 
recanted their prior statements to the police, claimed loss of memory, or 
claimed that their earlier statements were tainted either by use of drugs, 
alcohol, or for some other reason.  Each had been threatened by the 
defendant’s brother prior to trial.219 
In yet another case, a witness was reluctant to testify and hid his face 
while he testified.  He was afraid because the defendant’s aunt had 
followed him from the courtroom on one occasion, and the witness’s 
brother, who was in custody, was assaulted by the defendant when they 
were both in jail two days after the witness’s earlier testimony.220 
Witness intimidation is often the reason why a witness’s testimony at 
trial is contrary or contradictory to that witness’s earlier statements to 
the police.221  Three teenage witnesses in one case testified at the 
defendant’s preliminary hearing.  During each of the three witnesses’ 
testimony, the defendant’s brother sat in the courtroom and glared at the 
witness.222  At the time of jury trial, all three witnesses recanted their 
earlier testimony, and denied each piece of information and each 
statement they had given to the police.223  Even though all of the 
witnesses denied being threatened, the trial court noted that their 
demeanor during their testimony evidenced otherwise.224 
Witness intimidation and murder have also led federal trial courts to 
impanel anonymous jurors.  Vittorio Amuso, the reputed head of the 
Luchese crime family, was tried in 1992 for fourteen murders, tax fraud, 
and other crimes.225  Before trial, the prosecution presented evidence that 
 
 216. People v. Lybrand, 171 Cal. Rptr. 157, 162 (Ct. App. 1981). 
 217. Id. 
 218. See People v. Gutierrez, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897, 903 (Ct. App. 1994).   
 219. Id. at 903–04. 
 220. People v. Feagin, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 918, 921 (Ct. App. 1995). 
 221. See People v. Armijo, 270 Cal. Rptr. 496, 498 & n.1, 499–502 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 222. Id. at 502. 
 223. Id. at 497–99. 
 224. See id. at 498 & n.1, 499, 501–02. 
 225. United States v. Amuso, 21 F.3d 1251, 1254 (2d Cir. 1994). 
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Amuso had made prior attempts to interfere with witnesses and that 
Amuso, being the head of a powerful and violent crime organization, 
“had the means to engage in jury tampering.”226  The trial court granted 
the prosecutor’s request for an anonymous and sequestered jury.227  
Evidence during the trial showed that Amuso had the exclusive and 
ultimate authority to order murders on behalf of the crime family.  Two 
former captains of the Luchese family turned government witnesses and 
testified for the prosecution during the trial.228 They testified about 
fourteen murders committed over a two-year period, which were ordered 
by the defendant to eradicate disloyalty within the family.  Contracts 
were ordered against the two government witnesses prior to their 
testimony, and one was shot twelve times, but survived and testified.229  
The defendant was ultimately convicted of fifty-four counts of 
racketeering, extortion, fraud, bribery, and multiple murders.230 
In another case involving organized crime, the defendant, Nicodemo 
Scarfo, was the boss of the Philadelphia La Cosa Nostra.231 The 
defendant had conspired with a councilman and his administrative aide 
to extort $1,000,000 from a real estate developer in exchange for the 
councilman’s cooperation in the redevelopment project on the 
waterfront.  The real estate developer contacted the FBI and reported the 
extortion plan.  Unbeknownst to the crime family, the FBI had already 
infiltrated the organization. The case went to trial based on evidence 
obtained from the FBI and from two members of Scarfo’s organization, 
who agreed to testify as government witnesses.  This permitted the 
government to present virtually conclusive proof of the extortion 
scheme.  However, before trial, one prospective witness and one judge 
were murdered, and attempts had been made to bribe other judges.  The 
two government witnesses, one a former “capo” in the defendant’s 
group, testified to these facts.  Both government witnesses were 
threatened and relocated after trial.232 
In another case, defendants, members of an infamous Asian gang 
known as “Born to Kill,”233 were charged with multiple counts, 
 
 226. Id. at 1264. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 1254. 
 229. Id. at 1254, 1257. 
 230. Id. at 1253.  
 231. United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1017 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 232. Id. at 1017–20. 
 233. United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 794–95 (2d Cir. 1994). 
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including murder, robbery, and extortion.234 One robbery victim 
identified several of the gang members at a line-up as the ones who 
robbed his jewelry store.  After several attempts of intimidating the 
witness to keep him from testifying against them at trial, they murdered 
him with a close-up gunshot to his head.235  In other Born to Kill 
robberies, the robbers pointed and cocked their guns at the victims just 
prior to leaving.236 
Another Asian gang that specialized in extortion was the Green 
Dragon Gang.237  Members of the gang committed robberies and 
extorted “protection money” from Chinese-run businesses.  To protect 
their enterprise, the gang members often engaged in violence, murdering 
witnesses who identified them and victims who refused to pay the 
extortion money.238  In support of a motion to impanel an anonymous 
jury, the prosecution presented evidence of the gang’s extensive history 
of interfering with the judicial process, including the murders of 
witnesses in retaliation for testifying and attempted murders of witnesses 
to prevent them from testifying.  The trial court granted the motion for 
an anonymous jury.239 
In yet another case, seven members of the Mexican Mafia (EME) 
were charged with a continuing enterprise of murder, drug distribution 
and firearm offenses. The gang had a written constitution, which 
included in the preamble the following statement: “Being a criminal 
organization . . .[w]e shall deal in drugs, contract killings, prostitution, 
large scale robbery [etc.].”240  One of the group’s tenets was to interfere 
with potential witnesses and to murder or attempt to murder members 
suspected of becoming informants.241 
Intimidation also occurs inside prison walls where incarcerated 
inmates are particularly vulnerable.  Because their movements are 
restricted, inmates are easy prey to other inmates.242 Prison inmate 
murders among notorious prison gangs are not unusual.  Taking out a 
prospective witness may be part of a gang initiation because some gangs, 
like the Aryan Brotherhood and the Mexican Mafia, require that 
prospective members kill as a condition of association.243  Prison gang 
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members are even able to plan and direct the murders of individuals 
housed in separate penitentiaries.244 
One prison case involved an inmate murder contracted by the Aryan 
Brotherhood, a violent white supremacist prison gang.245  The case 
describes how a contract was taken out on the victim because he had 
cheated an Aryan Brotherhood commissioner in another penitentiary.  
The cheated Aryan member successfully communicated the contract to a 
member of the Brotherhood incarcerated in a different federal prison, 
despite mail censorship and restrictions on inter-inmate correspondence.246 
One government witness was so frightened that he slashed his wrists and 
hanged himself in a phony suicide attempt, in order to be placed in the 
Witness Protection Program.247 
B. Witness Intimidation Statistics 
Statistics reflect an increase in victim and witness intimidation.  For 
example, a 1990 study conducted in New York City showed that 36% of 
victims and witnesses in criminal cases at the Bronx Criminal Court had 
been threatened, and 57% who had not been threatened nevertheless 
feared retaliation.248 
In 1994, the United States Department of Justice conducted a survey 
of 2350 state prosecutorial agencies that handle felony cases and staff at 
least 65,000 individuals.  Those individuals included attorneys, 
investigators, and support staff.249  Of the total number of offices 
surveyed, 75% provided either security or assistance for victims or 
witnesses in criminal cases who had been threatened.250  Approximately 
half of the offices reported that a staff member received a threat or was 
in fact assaulted.251  In fact, from 1992 to 1994, threats or assaults 
 
States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 244. See Silverstein, 732 F.2d at 1341–43.  Two of the inmates involved in the 
murder in Silverstein were also involved in other prison murders.  See id. at 1342–43; see 
also United States v. Mills, 704 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. 
Fountain, 642 F.2d 1083, 1085–86 (7th Cir.1982). 
 245. See Mills, 704 F.2d at 1555. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 1560. 
 248. Healey, supra note 11, at 13 n.3.  
 249. CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE 
COURTS, 1994, at 1 (1996). 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
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against staff members increased from 28% to 51%.252  In 74% of the 
offices, prosecutors failed to pursue a felony case to trial because of 
victims’ fears of retaliation.253  Eighty-two percent of the larger 
prosecutorial offices reported case dismissals because of the 
unavailability of prosecution witnesses.  Reluctance to testify, either 
because of fear of retribution or because of actual threats to victims, 
occurred in 92% of these offices, and to witnesses in 77% of the 
offices.254  In over half of the offices, a staff member was the victim of 
either a threat or an assault.  This indicated a 100% increase from two 
years earlier.255  Different types of security were employed to protect 
those threatened, including personal police protection, transportation 
under guard to and from court, or actual relocation of the threatened 
individual.256 
Another 1994 survey sampled 192 prosecutors and found that 51% of 
prosecutors in large jurisdictions, counties with populations greater than 
250,000, considered victim and witness intimidation a major problem.  
This same survey found that in small jurisdictions, counties with 
populations between 50,000 and 250,000, 43% of the prosecutors stated 
that victim and witness intimidation was a major problem.  Another 30% 
of large jurisdictions and 25% of small jurisdictions considered 
intimidation a moderately serious problem.257 
In 1995, the Department of Justice reported that victim and witness 
intimidation had been increasing over the past two decades.  Prosecutors 
estimated intimidation in 75% to 100% of cases that involved violent 
crimes in gang areas.258 
Neither those in charge of the Federal Witness Protection Program or 
the California program keep statistics on the number of individuals who 
leave the program and are threatened or assaulted.  Nor are any statistics 
kept on the number of individuals that leave the program and are 
eventually killed.259 
C. Witness Protection Programs 
1.  The Federal Program 
In the late 1960s, the United States Department of Justice recognized 
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that victim and witness intimidation had become a serious impediment to 
obtaining testimony in organized crime cases.260  This concern was also 
fueled by statistics that revealed that a staggering number of crimes were 
never reported.261  In response, Congress enacted the Organized Crime 
Control Act of 1970, which laid the basis for the Federal Witness 
Protection Program.262 
The Federal Witness Protection Program263 was authorized by the 
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.264  Originally, the program was 
formulated to purchase and maintain housing facilities for protected 
witnesses, but that approach was discarded.265  The legislative intent was 
 
 260. Healey, supra note 11, at 6. 
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Stat. 922, 933–34 (1970).  Title V authorizes the United States Attorney General to 
protect and maintain federal or state organized crime witnesses and their families.  
Sections 501 through 504 provide: 
Sec. 501.  The Attorney General of the United States is authorized to provide 
for the security of Government witnesses, potential Government witnesses, and 
the families of Government witnesses and potential witnesses in legal 
proceedings against any person alleged to have participated in an organized 
criminal activity. 
Sec. 502.  The Attorney General of the United States is authorized to rent, 
purchase, modify, or remodel protected housing facilities and to otherwise 
offer to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of witnesses and persons 
intended to be called as Government witnesses, and the families of witnesses 
and persons intended to be called as Government witnesses in legal 
proceedings instituted against any person alleged to have participated in an 
organized criminal activity whenever, in his judgment, testimony from, or a 
willingness to testify by, such a witness would place his life or person, or the 
life or person of a member of his family or household, in jeopardy.  Any 
person availing himself of an offer by the Attorney General to use such 
facilities may continue to use such facilities for as long as the Attorney 
General determines the jeopardy to his life or person continues. 
Sec. 503.  As used in this title, “Government” means the United States, any 
State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any 
territory or possession of the United States, any political subdivision, or any 
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof.  The offer of facilities to 
witnesses may be conditioned by the Attorney General upon reimbursement in 
whole or in part to the United States by any State or any political subdivision, 
or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof of the cost of 
maintaining and protecting such witnesses. 
Sec. 504.  There is hereby authorized to be appropriated from time to time such 
funds as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this title. 
Id.  
 265. Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 586–87 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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twofold: to create an incentive for persons involved in organized crime 
to become informants266 and to recognize “a felt moral obligation to 
repay citizens who risk life by carrying out their duty as citizens to 
testify.”267  Again, as originally formulated, services were to be limited 
to witnesses of organized crime,268 but in its current form, the program 
provides protective services to witnesses and family members in cases 
involving organized crime “or other serious offense, if the Attorney 
General determines that an offense involving a crime of violence 
directed at the witness . . . is likely to be committed.”269  Those services 
may be provided as long as the danger to the protected individual 
continues.270  The services provided to the protected individuals may 
include physical protection, documents for a new identity, housing, 
transportation, subsistence for living, assistance in obtaining 
employment, and other services needed to make the individual self-
sustaining.271  In return, the identity and location of the individual will 
not be disclosed, unless law enforcement officials indicate the individual 
is under a criminal felony investigation.272  Knowing, unauthorized 
disclosure subjects a person to a fine of $5000 and/or imprisonment for 
five years.273 
Prior to admission into the program, an evaluation of the individual’s 
suitability must be performed and the individual also must undergo a 
psychological examination.274  In addition, the individual must execute a 
memorandum of understanding that outlines his duties, obligations and 
responsibilities—to testify in and provide information to law 
enforcement concerning the criminal proceedings, to refrain from 
committing any crime, to avoid detection and to cooperate with all 
reasonable requests of those protecting the person.275  The Attorney 
General may terminate protection if the protected person “substantially 
breaches” the memorandum of understanding, or provides false 
information.276  Physical protection for those who enter the program is 
provided by the United States Marshal’s office.277 
In November 1996, the House of Representatives held hearings on the 
 
 266. Id. at 586. 
 267. Garcia v. United States, 666 F.2d 960, 963 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 268. See Organized Crime Control Act § 501. 
 269. 18 U.S.C. § 3521(a)(1) (2000). 
 270. 18 U.S.C. § 3521(b)(1). 
 271. 18 U.S.C. § 3521(b)(1)(A)–(F). 
 272. See 18 U.S.C. § 3521(b)(1)(G). 
 273. 18 U.S.C. § 3521(b)(3). 
 274. 18 U.S.C. § 3521(c). 
 275. 18 U.S.C. § 3521(d)(1)(A)–(E). 
 276. 18 U.S.C. § 3521(f). 
 277. United States Marshals Service, 28 C.F.R. § 0.111 (2001). 
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Federal Witness Protection Program.278  From its inception in 1970 to 
the date of the hearings, the program had provided protection and 
assistance for more than 6600 witnesses and 8000 of their family 
members.  There is a rigorous review process for applicants, and all 
adults who enter the program have psychological examinations.279  No 
one that has followed the rules and guidelines has been killed.  However, 
there have been some who have not abided by the program’s conditions 
and have lost their lives.280  No statistics are kept on the number of such 
occurrences.  Nor are statistics kept on the number of criminal cases 
which were not prosecuted because witnesses refused to testify or 
provide evidence due to intimidation. 
One protected witness who violated the rules by giving interviews to 
the press, revealing his new identity, and allowing himself to be 
photographed was discharged from the program and unsuccessfully sued 
claiming a violation of his constitutional rights.281  Another ultimately 
unsuccessful claim against the government was for negligence when a 
person protected by the program committed a murder.282  In another 
case, a creditor claimed that the government committed an 
unconstitutional taking of his property when he was unable to locate a 
debtor protected by the program.  The creditor’s claim was also 
unsuccessful. 283 
A series of lawsuits against the government involved the relocation of 
children with their protected parent, without notification to the 
noncustodial parent.284  In each of the cases, the affected parent lost all 
contact with his or her children and could not find out their new 
identities or new locations.285  One parent lost contact with his children 
 
 278. See Witness Protection Programs in America, Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996). 
 279. Id. at 39–40 (statement of Stephen J. T’Kach, Associate Director, Office of 
Enforcement Operations, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice). 
 280. Id. at 40. 
 281. Garcia v. United States, 666 F.2d 960, 961–62 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 282. See Bergmann v. United States, 689 F.2d 789, 790, 797 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 283. Melo-Tone Vending, Inc. v. United States, 666 F.2d 687, 687, 689 (1st Cir. 
1981). 
 284. See, e.g., Prisco v. United States, 851 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1988); Franz v. United 
States, 707 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 702 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1983); 
Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1980); Leonhard v. Mitchell, 473 F.2d 
709 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 285. Leonhard, 473 F.2d at 711; Leonhard, 633 F.2d at 604–05; Ruffalo, 702 F.2d 
at 712–13; Prisco, 851 F.2d at 94; Franz, 707 F.2d at 589–90.  
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for eight years.286  Each parent eventually had to file a lawsuit in order to 
obtain relief.  After the United States Supreme Court decided in 
Santosky v. Kramer that natural parents are entitled to due process before 
their rights in their children may be dissolved,287 courts have held that 
noncustodial parents have a right to notice of and a hearing on the 
relocation of their children as part of the Witness Protection Program.288  
This right is based on the fundamental liberty interest parents have in the 
care and management of their children’s lives.289  This principle is now 
codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3524, which requires compliance with child 
custody orders and notification to the affected parent.290 
Despite the success of the federal Witness Protection Program, “[t]he 
strict requirements for entry to the . . . program, the high cost of 
providing lifelong services to witnesses and their families, and the 
personal sacrifices involved in participating in the program have led a 
number of prosecutors and police to seek [other alternatives].”291 
2. The California Witness Protection Program 
In 1997, the State of California enacted its witness protection 
program,292 administered by the attorney general.  It provides for the 
 
 286. See Leonhard, 633 F.2d at 606. 
 287. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1982). 
 288. See, e.g., Franz, 707 F.2d at 596, 608; Prisco, 851 F.2d at 97.  
 289. See Prisco, 851 F.2d at 97. 
 290. 18 U.S.C. § 3524(a)–(c) (2000). 
 291. Healey, supra note 11, at 5.   
 292. California Penal Code sections 14020 through 14033 provide: 
§ 14020.  Witness Protection Program 
  There is hereby established the Witness Protection Program. 
§ 14021.  Definitions 
As used in this title: 
  (a) “Witness” means any person who has been summoned, or is 
reasonably expected to be summoned, to testify in a criminal matter, including 
grand jury proceedings, for the people whether or not formal legal proceedings 
have been filed.  Active or passive participation in the criminal matter does not 
disqualify an individual from being a witness.  “Witness” may also apply to 
family, friends, or associates of the witness who are deemed by the Attorney 
General to be endangered. 
  (b) “Credible evidence” means evidence leading a reasonable person to 
believe that substantial reliability should be attached to the evidence. 
  (c) “Protection” means formal admission into a witness protection 
program established by this title memorialized by a written agreement between 
the Attorney General and the witness. 
§ 14022.  Administration of program; Attorney General 
  The program shall be administered by the Attorney General.  In any 
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criminal proceeding within this state, when the action is brought by local 
prosecutors, where credible evidence exists of a substantial danger that a 
witness may suffer intimidation or retaliatory violence, the Attorney General 
may reimburse state and local agencies for the costs of providing witness 
protection services. 
§ 14023.  Prioritization 
  The Attorney General shall give priority to matters involving organized 
crime, gang activities, drug trafficking, and cases involving a high degree of 
risk to the witness.  Special regard shall also be given to the elderly, the young, 
battered, victims of domestic violence, the infirm, the handicapped, and 
victims of hate incidents. 
§ 14024.  Coordination of efforts between state and local agencies; 
reimbursements 
  The Attorney General shall coordinate the efforts of state and local 
agencies to secure witness protection services and then reimburse those state 
and local agencies for the costs of the services that he or she determines to be 
necessary to protect a witness from bodily injury and otherwise to assure the 
health, safety, and welfare of the witness.  The Attorney General may 
reimburse the state or local agencies that provide witnesses with any of the 
following: 
(a) Armed protection or escort by law enforcement officials or security 
personnel before, during, or subsequent to, legal proceedings. 
(b) Physical relocation to an alternate residence. 
(c) Housing expense. 
(d) Appropriate documents to establish a new identity. 
(e) Transportation or storage of personal possessions. 
(f) Basic living expenses, including, but not limited to, food, transportation, 
utility costs, and health care. 
(g) Other services as needed and approved by the Attorney General. 
 § 14025.  Witness protection agreement; terms 
  The witness protection agreement shall be in writing, and shall specify the 
responsibilities of the protected person that establish the conditions for the 
Attorney General providing protection.  The protected person shall agree to all 
of the following: 
(a) If a witness or potential witness, to testify in and provide information 
to all appropriate law enforcement officials concerning all appropriate 
proceedings. 
(b) To refrain from committing any crime. 
(c) To take all necessary steps to avoid detection by others of the facts 
concerning the protection provided to that person under this title. 
(d)  To comply with legal obligations and civil judgments against that 
person. 
(e) To cooperate with all reasonable requests of officers and employees of 
this state who are providing protection under this title. 
(f) To designate another person to act as agent for the service of process. 




(g) To make a sworn statement of all outstanding legal obligations, 
including obligations concerning child custody and visitation. 
(h) To disclose any probation or parole responsibilities, and if the person 
is on probation or parole. 
(i) To regularly inform the appropriate program official of his or her 
activities and current address. 
§ 14025.5.  Liability of Attorney General 
  The Attorney General shall not be liable for any condition in the witness 
protection agreement that cannot reasonably be met due to a witness 
committing a crime during participation in the program. 
§ 14026.  Funding; uses 
  Funds available to implement this title may be used for any of the 
following: 
(a) To protect witnesses where credible evidence exists that they may be 
in substantial danger of intimidation or retaliatory violence because of their 
testimony. 
(b) To provide temporary and permanent relocation of witnesses and 
provide for their transition and well-being into a safe and secure environment. 
(c) To pay the costs of administering the program. 
§ 14026.5.  Witness deemed victim 
  For the purposes of this title, notwithstanding Article 1 (commencing with 
Section 13959) of Chapter 5 of Part 4 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the 
Government Code, a witness, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 14021, 
selected by the Attorney General to receive services under the program 
established pursuant to this title because he or she has been or may be 
victimized due to the testimony he or she will give, shall be deemed a victim. 
§ 14027.  Guidelines and regulations 
  The Attorney General shall issue appropriate guidelines and may adopt 
regulations to implement this title.  These guidelines shall include: 
(a) A process whereby state and local agencies shall apply for 
reimbursement of the costs of providing witness protection services. 
(b) An appropriate level for the match that shall be made by local 
agencies.  The Attorney General may also establish a process through which to 
waive the required local match when appropriate. 
§ 14028.  Immunity from civil liability 
  The State of California, the counties and cities within the state, and their 
respective officers and employees shall have immunity from civil liability for 
any decision declining or revoking protection to a witness under this title. 
§ 14029.  Confidentiality of witness information 
  All information relating to any witness participating in the program 
established pursuant to this title shall remain confidential and is not subject to 
disclosure pursuant to the California Public Records Act (Chapter 3.5 
(commencing with Section 6250) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government 
Code) and, if a change of name has been approved by the program, the order to 
show cause is not subject to the publication requirement of Section 1277 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure. 
§ 14030.  Legal process; liaison with United States Marshal 
(a) The Attorney General shall establish a liaison with the United States 
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protection and relocation of witnesses “where credible evidence exists 
that they may be in substantial danger of intimidation or retaliatory 
violence because of their testimony.”293  The reason for the enactment 
was the legislature’s recognition that retaliation against witnesses has a 
serious negative impact on the prosecution of crime.294  At one of the 
Assembly Committee’s hearings, it was noted that 
[a]ccording to a recent Los Angeles Times series, more than a thousand gang 
killers are walking the streets of Los Angeles.  More and more gang killers 
responsible for about 40% of Los Angeles County’s murders remain free.  
Witness intimidation helps keep them on the street.  Witnesses have been killed 
and many more threatened.  Incidents of witness intimidation occur frequently 
 
Marshal’s office in order to facilitate the legal processes over which the 
federal government has sole authority, including, but not limited to, those 
processes included in Section 14024.  The liaison shall coordinate all 
requests for federal assistance relating to witness protection as established by 
this title. 
(b) The Attorney General shall pursue all federal sources that may be 
available for implementing this program.  For that purpose, the Attorney 
General shall establish a liaison with the United States Department of Justice. 
(c) The Attorney General with the Board of Control shall establish 
procedures to maximize federal funds for witness protection services. 
§ 14031.  Annual reports  
  Commencing one year after the effective date of this title, the Attorney 
General shall make an annual report to the Legislature no later than January 1 
on the fiscal and operational status of the program. 
§ 14032.  Administrative costs 
  The administrative costs of the Attorney General for the purposes of 
administering this title shall be limited to 5 percent of all costs incurred 
pursuant to this title. 
§ 14033.  Budget; appropriations 
(a) The Governor’s budget shall specify the estimated amount in the 
Restitution Fund that is in excess of the amount needed to pay claims pursuant 
to Sections 13960 to 13965, inclusive, of the Government Code, to pay 
administrative costs for increasing restitution funds, and to maintain a prudent 
reserve. 
(b) It is the intent of the Legislature that, notwithstanding Government 
Code Section 13967, in the annual Budget Act, funds be appropriated to the 
Attorney General from those funds that are in excess of the amount specified 
pursuant to subdivision (a) for the purposes of this title. 
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 14020–14033 (West 2000 & Supp. 2002). 
 293. Id. § 14026(a). 
 294. Assembly Comm. Report on AB 856, 1997–98 Reg. Sess., at 3 (Cal. Apr. 22, 
1997), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/asm/ab_0851-0900/ab 
856_cfa_19970421_073716_asm_comm.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2002).   
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enough to frighten potential witnesses from cooperating with prosecutors.  Gang 
cases are the hardest to solve. 295 
The assembly concluded that 
[t]here is a compelling need for a statewide [witness protection program].  The 
problems posed by witness intimidation in gang cases cannot be overstated.  
Even in cases where there has been no direct intimidation, there is often a need 
for relocation to secure the cooperation of witnesses who for good reason fear 
that they and their families are at risk if they cooperate with law 
enforcement.296 
One of the articles in the series referenced by the assembly stated that 
“[t]he witness protection problem is particularly severe in Los Angeles 
County, where authorities say witness intimidation and killings have 
helped fuel a cycle of violence in which more and more people are too 
frightened to testify, allowing more killers to go free.”297  More recent 
articles have recounted the ability of imprisoned defendants to arrange 
contract killings.  According to one article, because of the large volume 
of telephone calls made by inmates, only a small percentage of them are 
monitored.  Some facilities, such as county jails, do not monitor calls at 
all.298 Several news articles have featured stories about crime victims 
who have been attacked, or antigang activists who have been killed.299  
The California Department of Justice, through the Law Enforcement 
Information Center, recorded 2966 felony and misdemeanor arrests for 
witness intimidation from 1992 through 1997,300 and from 1995 to 1996, 
thirty-eight persons were incarcerated for witness intimidation.301  
 
 295. Id. at 1. 
 296. Id. at 5.   
 297. Ted Rohrlich & Fredric N. Tulsky, Efforts to Protect Witnesses Fall Short in 
L.A. County, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1996, at A1.  Several other articles contain 
information on witness intimidation.  Accused Rapist Shoots Witness, Kills Himself, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2000, at A21; Michael Krikorian, Case of Teacher’s Shooting Dropped 
After 2 Trials, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1997, at B3; Gina Piccalo & Kurt Streeter, Venice 
Anti-Gang Activist Killed in His Driveway, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2000, at B1; George 
Ramos, Witness Tells of His Life in Prison Gang, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1997, at B1; 
Daniel Yi, Inmates Do More than Phone Home, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2001, at A1; see 
also Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d 203, 222 n.14 (Cal. 2000) (listing articles). 
 298. Yi, supra note 297 (noting that with the First Amendment as a shield and 
monitoring spotty, prisoners make calls to arrange crimes that include murder).   
 299. Gunman Shoots 2, Kills Self in Court Hall, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Oct. 21, 
2000, at News 4; Piccalo & Streeter, supra note 297; Prisoner Moved to Cut Alleged 
Mob Ties, PRESS-TELEGRAM, Jan. 9, 2001, at A3.  
 300. Assembly Comm. Report on AB 856, 1997–98 Reg. Sess., at 2 (Cal. Apr. 22, 
1997), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/asm/ab_0851-0900/ab 
856_cfa_19970421_073716_asm_comm.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2002).   
 301. Assembly Comm. Report on AB 856, 1997–98 Reg. Sess., at 2 (Cal. May 21, 
1997), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/asm/ab_0851-0900/ab 
856_cfa_19970421_073716_asm_comm.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2002); see CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(10) (West 2002) (prescribing either the death penalty or life 
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According to the Los Angeles County District Attorney, from 1995 to 
2000, twenty-five cases were filed that alleged the special circumstance 
of murdering a witness to a crime to prevent that person from testifying 
or in retaliation for testifying.  Moreover, during that period, the Los 
Angeles County District Attorney reported that 1600 cases of witness 
intimidation were being investigated and that in over 1000 gang murder 
cases, witnesses refused to cooperate.302 
The California witness protection program authorizes the attorney 
general to administer the program and to reimburse state and local 
agencies for the costs of providing witness protection services.303  Unlike 
the federal program, which has its own enforcement agency, the state 
must rely on local enforcement departments to provide whatever 
services they decide are appropriate and necessary.304  Those services 
include armed protection and armed escort before, during, and after legal 
proceedings; physical relocation; housing expenses; a new identity; 
transportation; subsistence allowance; and other services as needed.305  
The protection is limited to a period of six months.  If additional 
protection is warranted, however, an extension may be granted.306  
Again, this differs from the federal program, which has no time 
limitation for its services.  Furthermore, the period of protection is 
relatively short, because the majority of murder cases last one year or 
more from the time of commission of the crime until a verdict is 
rendered. 
Like the federal program, the witnesses protected under the California 
program must enter into a written agreement that specifies the 
responsibilities of the protected person, including the obligation to 
testify and provide information concerning the subject proceedings, to 
take steps to avoid detection, to cooperate with reasonable requests, and 
to continually inform program officials of his or her activities and 
current address.307  Priority for acceptance into the program is given to 
 
imprisonment as punishment for killing a witness in order to prevent that witness from 
testifying in a criminal proceeding). 
 302. See Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d 203, 222 n.14 (Cal. 2000). 
 303. CAL. PENAL CODE § 14022 (West 2002). 
 304. See id. § 14024. 
 305. Id. § 14024(a)–(g). 
 306. CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICY AND PROCEDURES MANUAL FOR LOCAL AND 
STATE PROSECUTING AGENCIES 9 (2000).   
 307. CAL. PENAL CODE § 14025 (West 2002).  A copy of the witness protection 
agreement is in the Appendix to this Article. 
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witnesses involved in matters related to organized crime, criminal street 
gangs, drug trafficking, and other cases involving a high degree of 
risk.308 
All information about witnesses in the program is confidential and not 
subject to disclosure.309  This raises the question of whether defense 
counsel is prevented from inquiring of a protected witness’s true name, 
new identity, or current address when the witness testifies at trial.  Most 
likely, this issue will arise in a future proceeding.  In federal court, trial 
judges have allowed witnesses in the program to testify without 
revealing their new identity when a sufficient showing of danger to the 
witness has been presented to the court,310 and have restricted questions 
on cross-examination about the protection program.311 Questions about 
payments and other government support have been allowed, but 
information about the protection itself has not.312 
Since its inception, the program has received an annual funding of 
three million dollars.313  In its initial year of operation, January 1, 1998 
through December 31, 1998, the program opened 125 cases for 154 
witnesses, which involved 275 defendants, and also provided protection 
for 207 family members.314 Costs totaled almost three quarters of a 
million dollars.315  Of these cases, 77% (ninety-six cases) were gang-
related, 4% (five cases) involved drug trafficking, 15% (nineteen cases) 
were high-risk offenses, and 4% (five cases) involved domestic 
violence.316 Overall, 96% were crimes of violence, with almost 70% 
involving murder or attempted murder.317 
The second year of operation, January 1, 1999 through December 31, 
1999, saw an increase of over 200% in the number of new cases.318  The 
program opened 379 new cases, which involved 456 witnesses, 665 
defendants, and also provided protection for 665 relatives.319 It is 
amazing to note that in the first two years of its operation, the program 
had already served 10% of the total number of people protected in the 
Federal Witness Protection Program during its twenty-six years of 
 
 308. Id. § 14023. 
 309. Id. § 14029. 
 310. See United States v. Watson, 599 F.2d 1149, 1157 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 311. See United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1407 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 312. See id. 
 313. CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ANNUAL REPORT TO THE 
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 4 (2000).  
 314. CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ANNUAL REPORT TO THE 
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 5 (1999).   
 315. Id.  
 316. Id. at 6.   
 317. Id. at 7.   
 318. CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 313, at 1.  
 319. Id. at 5.  
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operation.  Of the cases opened in its second year, 71% (272 cases) were 
gang-related, 5% (nineteen cases) involved drug trafficking, 18% (sixty-
eight cases) were high-risk crimes, 1% (two cases) were organized 
crime, and 5% (eighteen cases) involved domestic violence.320  Of the 
total number of cases, 95% were crimes of violence, with 65% involving 
murder or attempted murder.321  Total funds encumbered to date were 
approximately two and one-half million dollars.322  These figures provide 
circumstantial evidence of the growth and spread of witness 
intimidation.  Initially, twenty-five counties participated in the program 
during the first year of operation, but the number grew to thirty-five 
counties in its second year of operation.323 
Unlike the federal program, no litigation has been filed under the 
California program, most likely because it is new.  To avoid liability for 
the safety or misconduct of witnesses participating in witness protection 
programs, program administrators are advised not to make promises to 
the witnesses unless the promises can be kept and are approved by those 
with the authority to comply with such promises.324  Prior case law will 
most likely be relied on for the standard of care to be exercised by those 
who protect the witnesses and family members who enter the program.  
Because there is no one enforcement agency in charge of protecting the 
witnesses, the standardization of care and treatment will necessarily be 
diverse. 
In one case, Carpenter v. City of Los Angeles, a robbery victim was 
shot after he testified at a defendant’s preliminary hearing.325  Carpenter 
sued the City of Los Angeles for the damages he suffered as a result of 
the shooting, and when he lost at trial, he asked the court of appeal to 
determine whether the city and its police department owe a duty to their 
witnesses in criminal cases, to warn them of threats to their lives.326 
After Carpenter testified at defendant Jenkins’s preliminary hearing, 
Jenkins made a threatening remark to him, which Carpenter relayed to 
the investigating officer, Detective Williams.  Williams told Carpenter 
essentially not to worry about Jenkins, because he was just “a street 
 
 320. Id. at 6.  
 321. Id. at 7.  
 322. Id. at 4.  
 323. Id. at 1.  
 324. FINN & HEALEY, supra note 181, at xii. 
 325. Carpenter v. City of Los Angeles, 281 Cal. Rptr. 500, 500–02 (Ct. App. 1991).   
 326. Id. at 500. 
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punk.”327  Thereafter, detectives were informed that Jenkins had a 
“contract hit” out on Carpenter.328  That threat was never communicated 
to Carpenter, who was subsequently shot in the head, abdomen, and 
legs.329  After that, Carpenter was placed in a witness protection program 
and moved to another state.330 
The court of appeal in Carpenter fashioned the following rule: when a 
criminal prosecution witness is assured by the city that the defendant 
poses no real danger to the witness’s safety, then a special relationship is 
established between the witness and the city.331  This relationship 
establishes a duty of care owed by the city to the witness.  In Carpenter, 
this duty of care obligated the city to warn Carpenter of Jenkins’s threat 
to his life.332 
Considerations of policy mandate a finding that the City owed [Carpenter] a 
duty of care.  Reasonable care required that the police, after lulling [Carpenter] 
into a false sense of security, inform him of this very real threat.  We are 
speaking here of a duty to warn.  As evidenced by the Witness Protection 
Program in which [Carpenter] was placed after being shot, the City already 
recognizes it has a duty to protect certain witnesses.333 
This case had an ironic and tragic result.  Detective Williams sat with 
the prosecution at Jenkins’s robbery trial in superior court.  After 
Detective Williams left the courthouse and picked up his son at the Faith 
Baptist Church School, Jenkins murdered him.  Jenkins was subsequently 
convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances and 
sentenced to death.334  He is currently on death row.335 
Following Carpenter, the court of appeal was asked to decide whether 
the city was negligent for the murder of a witness days before she was to 
testify for the prosecution.336  In this case the witness, Demetria, had 
been threatened personally in a telephone call she received.337  She 
informed the detective of the threat, and the detective advised her that he 
would provide relocation if the threats continued.  He did not inform her 
that the same defendant against whom she was to testify was a suspect in 
two other murders, that he had been threatening other witnesses, that he 
was carrying a handgun, and that he was considered a danger to the 
 
 327. Id. at 501. 
 328. See id. at 501–02.  
 329. Id. at 502. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. at 504. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. at 505 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). 
 334. People v. Jenkins, 997 P.2d 1044, 1066–67 (Cal. 2000). 
 335. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., Male Death Row Inmates, at http://www.cdc.state.ca.us/ 
Issues/Capital/PDF/Death_Row.pdf (Sept. 1, 2002). 
 336. Wallace v. City of Los Angeles, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113, 114–15 (Ct. App. 1993).  
 337. Id. at 116–17. 
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community at large, especially to any witnesses who might testify 
against him.  The detective knew all of this information at the time the 
witness received the threats.338 
The court found that when Demetria agreed to become a witness for 
the prosecution, she was in a position of peril, which was not of her own 
making, and which she could not on her own readily discover.339  The 
police also “skewed her appreciation” of any danger and, in fact, gave 
her the impression, by what they did and did not tell her, that she was 
not in danger.  The police, furthermore, placed Demetria in the 
dangerous position she was in by involving her as a witness, and this 
special relationship created a duty to warn her of the real danger to her 
life.340 
The court concluded: 
If we were to hold that an officer can, with impunity, fail to disclose important 
information to a witness regarding his or her safety, or induce a witness to 
detrimentally rely on the officer regarding such safety, the number of persons 
who would henceforth be willing to testify on behalf of the prosecution would 
most likely fall dramatically.  Consequently, so would the number of criminals 
convicted for their crimes.  As the court said in Carpenter, “‘Criminal 
prosecution would screech to a grinding halt without the assistance of 
witnesses.’”341 
This conclusion raises the question of whether trial courts, if required 
to order the discovery of identity of witnesses who have been attacked or 
threatened, will expose city governments and courts to possible lawsuits 
if the witness is subsequently killed.  Furthermore, any newspaper 
articles about such ordered discovery may have a chilling effect on other 
witnesses to come forward and report criminal activity. 
V.  WAIVER BY MISCONDUCT 
A. The Waiver Doctrine Is Based on Principles of Equity and Honesty 
As noted earlier, confrontation, like any constitutional right, may 
be surrendered either expressly or by conduct.  One doctrine that has 
been in existence since the seventeenth century is the doctrine of 
“waiver by misconduct.”342  Succinctly stated, the doctrine provides that 
 
 338. Id. at 117, 121. 
 339. See id. at 121. 
 340. See id. at 121–22. 
 341. Id. at 126. 
 342. The Court in Reynolds v. United States recounted Lord Morley’s case from the 
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if a defendant, through misconduct, has prevented a witness from 
appearing and testifying at his trial, then he has waived his right of 
confrontation as to that witness and hearsay evidence with respect to that 
witness’s testimony is admissible.343  The defendant may have procured 
the witness’s nonappearance through threats, acts of violence, or murder; 
in fact, many cases involve instances where the witness has been 
murdered.344  The waiver doctrine has been followed in the federal 
courts345 and was codified as a rule of evidence in 1997.346 
 
year 1666, and others which followed it, for the proposition that if a witness was absent 
from court “by the means or procurement of the prisoner,” then hearsay statements of the 
witness were admissible in place of live testimony.  Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145, 158–59 (1878). 
 343. See id. at 158–60. 
 344. See, e.g., United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 813–15 (10th Cir. 2000); 
United States v. Johnson, 219 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Emery, 186 
F.3d 921, 924–26 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C. Cir. 
1997); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1278–79 (1st Cir. 1996); United States 
v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 798, 814 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 
667–68 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 985 (11th Cir. 1985); 
United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 621 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mastrangelo, 
693 F.2d 269, 270 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 345. See, e.g., Magouirk v. Warden, 237 F.3d 549, 552–53 (5th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Ochoa, 229 F.3d 631, 639 (7th Cir. 2000); Johnson, 219 F.3d at 355; Cherry, 
217 F.3d at 814–21; Geraci v. Senkowski, 211 F.3d 6, 9–10 (2d Cir. 2000); Emery, 186 
F.3d at 926–27; Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 361–62 (5th Cir. 1998); White, 116 
F.3d at 911–16; Miller, 116 F.3d at 667–69; Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1278–81; Thai, 29 
F.3d at 814–15; United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47–48 (2d Cir. 1992); Bagby v. 
Kuhlman, 932 F.2d 131, 135–37 (2d Cir. 1991); Rouco, 765 F.2d at 995; United States v. 
Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784, 788–89 (2d Cir. 1984); Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272–73; 
Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1200–03 (6th Cir. 1982); Thevis, 665 F.2d at 630–32; 
United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 625–30 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1355–60 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 346. In December 1997, subdivision (b)(6), which codified the waiver by 
misconduct doctrine, was added to Rule 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Rule 804 
now provides: 
Rule 804.  Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable 
(a)Definition of unavailability.: “Unavailability as a witness” includes 
situations in which the declarant— 
(1)is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from 
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant’s statement; or 
(2)persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the 
declarant’s statement despite an order of the court to do so; or 
(3)testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant’s 
statement; or 
(4)is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death 
or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(5)is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has 
been unable to procure the declarant’s attendance (or in the case of a 
hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), the declarant’s 
attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means. 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim 
of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or 
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In one of the earliest statements of the waiver doctrine, the Reynolds 
Court discussed the admissibility of a witness’s prior trial testimony, 
when the defendant purposefully prevented the witness from appearing 
and testifying in court.347  The defendant had been charged with bigamy.  
His second wife lived at the defendant’s home and an officer had tried 
several times to serve her with a subpoena to testify at the defendant’s 
current trial, but the defendant had prevented service on the witness.  
After a hearing about the subpoena service, the trial court found that the 
witness’s nonappearance was caused by the defendant’s deliberate acts 
and, therefore, ruled the witness’s prior trial testimony admissible.348  
The court further found that the admission of the prior testimony did not 
violate the defendant’s right to confrontation as to that witness: 
 The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at which he should be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; but if a witness is absent by his own 
wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to 
supply the place of that which he has kept away.  The Constitution does not 
guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his own 
wrongful acts.  It grants him the privilege of being confronted with the 
witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot 
insist on his privilege.  If, therefore, [the witnesses are] absent by his 
procurement . . . he is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights have 
been violated.349 
Principles of equity and honesty form the bedrock of the doctrine.  
Similar to the equitable argument of “clean hands,”350 the doctrine 
recognizes the principle that one shall not be allowed to profit from his 
own wrongful conduct; in turn, this is based on principles of honesty, 
namely, that one shall not be rewarded for his acts of dishonesty.351 
 
wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of preventing 
the witness from attending or testifying. 
(b)Hearsay exceptions.  The following are not excluded by the hearsay 
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
  . . . 
  (6) Forfeiture by wrongdoing.  A statement offered against a party 
that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and 
did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness. 
FED. R. EVID. 804 (emphasis added). 
 347. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–60 (1878). 
 348. See id. at 159–60. 
 349. Id. at 158. 
 350. Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982) (“The rule is also based 
on a principle of reciprocity similar to the equitable doctrine of ‘clean hands.’”). 
 351. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159. 
The rule has its foundation in the maxim that no one shall be permitted to take 
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Misconduct that procures a witness’s unavailability at trial involves an 
intentional choice by the accused to prevent the admission of crucial 
evidence—not by the use of legitimate rules of criminal procedure or 
evidentiary restrictions, but by acts of subterfuge.  One who intentionally 
threatens a witness, attacks a witness, or has another commit such acts at 
his behest, has freely chosen to use deceptive means to obtain an 
advantage.  When the witness is crucial, such misconduct may decimate 
the prosecution’s case.352  The loss of that testimony will result in the 
prosecution being unable to proceed with its case.  By precluding this 
testimony, the defendant has not used the accepted rules of criminal 
procedure or evidence, but has resorted to nefarious conduct to obtain an 
advantage or an outright dismissal.  Such misconduct also violates the 
prosecution’s right to present its evidence and carry its burden of proof. 
 When a defendant murders an individual who is a percipient witness to acts 
of criminality (or procures his demise) in order to prevent him from appearing 
at an upcoming trial, he denies the government the benefit of the witness’s live 
testimony.  In much the same way, when a defendant murders such a witness (or 
procures his demise) in order to prevent him from assisting an ongoing criminal 
investigation, he is denying the government the benefit of the witness’s live 
testimony at a future trial.353 
In cases where the defendant’s misconduct procures the unavailability 
of a witness, this misconduct, rather than the applicable legal principles, 
may determine the outcome.  The outcome may be based on the 
defendant’s chicanery, rather than on reliable evidence tested by the trier 
of fact, who has the opportunity to listen to the witness and judge his or 
her credibility.  If the witness does testify, but the defendant’s 
intimidation causes the witness to give false, incomplete or misleading 
testimony, cross-examination may or may not bring out the truth.  Even 
if cross-examination does bring out the truth, the misconduct by the 
defendant will introduce false evidence into the record, which may 
produce an unjust decision.354  In this way, the defendant’s misconduct 
undermines the integrity of the adversary process, the very system which 
the Confrontation Clause was intended to protect, and is, therefore, 
necessarily dishonest and inequitable. 
Since its initial formulation, the doctrine has undergone numerous 
changes.  As noted, it has been codified into a federal rule of evidence 
 
advantage of his own wrong . . . .  We are content with this long-established 
usage, which, so far as we have been able to discover, has rarely been departed 
from.  It is the outgrowth of a maxim based on the principles of common 
honesty, and, if properly administered, can harm no one. 
Id. 
 352. See supra note 6 (defining the term “crucial witness”). 
 353. United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279–80 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 354. Morgan v. Bennett, 204 F.3d 360, 367 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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and the Advisory Committee observed that the rule was intended 
to provide that a party forfeits the right to object on hearsay grounds to the 
admission of a declarant’s prior statement when the party’s deliberate 
wrongdoing or acquiescence therein procured the unavailability of the declarant 
as a witness.  This recognizes the need for a prophylactic rule to deal with 
abhorrent behavior “which strikes at the heart of the system of justice itself.”355 
The doctrine encompasses not only situations where the defendant’s 
acts were the direct cause of the witness unavailability, but also those 
cases where third parties have caused the witness’s unavailability, either 
at the behest of the defendant or in a conspiracy with the defendant.356  
As a result, co-conspirators are subject to the doctrine if their acts are “in 
furtherance and within the scope of an ongoing conspiracy and 
reasonably foreseeable as a natural or necessary consequence thereof.”357  
Moreover, the doctrine has expanded to allow into evidence not only 
prior trial testimony, but also grand jury testimony,358 as well as 
statements to police officers and other unsworn extrajudicial 
statements.359 
The courts that have utilized the doctrine have required an evidentiary 
hearing, wherein the proponent of the hearsay evidence must carry its 
burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.360  Some courts 
have found that the failure to hold an evidentiary hearing is harmless 
 
 355. FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note (quoting United States v. 
Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982)).  The Advisory Committee also noted 
that the wrongful act need not be a criminal act.  Id. 
 356. See, e.g., United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 653–54 (2d Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 820–21 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 357. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820. 
 358. See, e.g., Geraci v. Senkowski, 211 F.3d 6, 9–10 (2d Cir. 2000); United States 
v. Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784, 788–89 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 
F.2d 269, 272–73 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 627–30 (5th 
Cir. 1982); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629–30 (10th Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1360 (8th Cir. 1976).  
 359. See, e.g., Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 650–57; United States v. Ochoa, 229 F.3d 631, 
639–41 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Johnson, 219 F.3d 349, 355–56 (4th Cir. 2000); 
Cherry, 217 F.3d at 819–21; United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999); 
United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Miller, 116 
F.3d 641, 667–68 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279–80 (1st 
Cir. 1996); United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 814–15 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47–48 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 993–
95 (11th Cir. 1985).  
 360. Only one court prior to the codification of the doctrine required proof by clear 
and convincing evidence.  Thevis, 665 F.2d at 630–31. 
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error.361  In Reynolds, the Court noted that although the defendant was 
present at the hearing on service of subpoena, he failed to provide any 
contrary evidence.362  Other courts have interpreted this as an indication 
by the Supreme Court that the proponent of the hearsay evidence has the 
burden of persuasion by a preponderance test as in preliminary fact 
determinations; however, once this burden is met, adverse inferences 
may be drawn from the defense’s failure to offer credible evidence to the 
contrary. 363 
Courts have also applied the doctrine when no charges have been filed 
against the defendant at the time of the misconduct.364  As long as it is 
reasonably foreseeable that an investigation will culminate in the 
bringing of criminal charges, the fact that the misdeed occurred at an 
earlier stage should not affect the operation and application of the 
doctrine.365  A contrary approach would create an incentive to accelerate 
the timetable and murder witnesses earlier rather than later.366  The 
doctrine has been applied in this context even though the right to 
confront is a trial right.367 
The waiver doctrine does not penalize the defendant, but rather 
attempts to level the uneven playing field created by the misconduct of 
the accused.368  Since the defendant has, by his contrivance, prevented 
the witness from appearing and testifying, it would be an absurdity to 
permit the same person to claim that his constitutional right to confront 
and cross-examine the witness has been violated.  Acquiescence to such 
an objection would result in the prosecution losing valuable evidence, 
because the hearsay statements would be inadmissible.  Acquiescence 
would also result in rewarding the defendant for his misdeed.  The very 
testimony that the defendant intended to prevent the jury from hearing 
would be unavailable to the prosecution; such a result was specifically 
eschewed by the Reynolds Court.369  The better view is that the 
 
 361. See, e.g., Johnson, 219 F.3d at 356; Miller, 116 F.3d at 669. 
 362. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 160 (1878). 
 363. See White, 116 F.2d at 911–13; Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1278–83; Thevis, 665 
F.2d at 632–33; Morgan v. Bennett, 204 F.3d 360, 367–68 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 364. See, e.g., Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 652; Emery, 186 F.3d at 925–26; Miller, 116 
F.3d at 667; Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1279.  
 365. Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1280. 
 366. Id. 
 367. See id. at 1279. 
 368. See Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982); White, 116 F.3d at 
912; Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1280–83; Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 361–62 (5th 
Cir. 1998); Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272–73; Balano, 618 F.2d at 629; Carlson, 547 
F.2d at 1359 & n.12. 
 369. If the testimony is not presented at trial, then the defendant has profited from 
his misconduct.  This result is contrary to the principle enunciated by the Reynolds 
Court.  Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878) (stating that courts will not 
allow a party to profit from his own wrongdoing).   
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defendant has waived his right of confrontation and cannot complain that 
he was denied the right to confront and cross-examine the witness, 
because he was the instrument of the witness’s nonappearance.370  To 
limit the introduction of such evidence would limit the proof against the 
defendant, the very result which the waiver doctrine seeks to remedy.371  
These same basic principles should obtain when the doctrine is applied 
to withholding the identity of threatened witnesses, as will be shown. 
B. A Defendant Who Has Threatened or Attacked a Crucial Witness 
Has Waived His Right to Know the Witness’s Identity 
1. Introduction 
There is no reason why the waiver by misconduct doctrine should not 
be extended to allow the nondisclosure of a threatened witness’s 
identity.  There are several reasons that weigh in favor of nondisclosure, 
including public policy,372 equity, and fairness.373  Each of these factors, 
as will be shown, tip the balance in favor of the witness’s rights as 
opposed to the defendant’s right of confrontation, and thus weigh against 
disclosure.374 
Admittedly, there are differences between the issue of witness identity 
nondisclosure and the issue originally addressed by the waiver doctrine, 
that is, the defendant’s procurement of a witness’s unavailability at trial.  
Unlike the waiver doctrine’s traditional application, where the witness is 
identified but not presented at trial, application of the doctrine to allow 
the nondisclosure of a threatened witness’s identity would involve a 
witness who is presented at trial, but not identified.  Moreover, allowing 
the nondisclosure of witness identity would not involve the admission of 
hearsay evidence because the witness himself would testify in court.  
These differences, however, do not preclude extending the doctrine to 
 
 370. See Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1359. 
 371. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 652–53. 
 372. Public policy considerations may limit the scope of the right of confrontation.  
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844–49 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020–21 
(1988); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62–65 (1980); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 
284, 295 (1973).  
 373. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158–59. 
 374. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 844–45 (“In holding that the use of this procedure 
violated the defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him, we suggested that any 
exception to the right ‘would surely be allowed only when necessary to further an 
important public policy.’”). 
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allow for nondisclosure of a witness’s identity if the witness’s life has 
been threatened by the defendant’s misconduct.375 
Invocation of the waiver by misconduct doctrine to preclude 
identifying the witness would require an evidentiary hearing at which the 
prosecution would be required to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence376 (1) that the defendant, or another at his behest, has 
threatened the life of the witness or a member of the witness’s 
immediate family; (2) that the defendant has the means and capability of 
carrying out the threat; (3) that the defendant caused the witness’s 
fear;377 (4) that the action was taken with the intention of preventing the 
witness from testifying;378 and (5) that the witness is in actual fear for his 
or her life, or for the lives of family members.  If all of these elements 
are proved by a preponderance of the evidence, then the witness’s 
identity is foreclosed from disclosure to the defense. 
2. Public Policy Considerations Weigh in Favor of Nondisclosure 
In one of its earlier opinions, the United States Supreme Court 
addressed the admissibility at the defendant’s retrial of prior trial 
testimony given by two witnesses who had died since the first trial.379  
The issue was whether the admission of the prior trial testimony violated 
 
 375. Although it may seem unlikely that a witness could be attacked or threatened 
and the accused not know the person’s identity, there are several ways this is possible.  
First, not all defendants are in custody throughout their proceedings and, thus, have the 
ability to follow a witness.  Furthermore, a witness may have been present at pretrial 
hearings and followed from the courtroom by the defendant or by cohorts of the 
defendant.  Or, the witness’s identity may have been disclosed to the defense, but 
because of threats the witness may have been given a new identity.  Of course, there are 
other possible scenarios in which this issue may arise. 
 376. California Evidence Code section 115 provides: 
  “Burden of proof” means the obligation of a party to establish by 
evidence a requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the trier 
of fact or the court.  The burden of proof may require a party to raise a 
reasonable doubt concerning the existence or nonexistence of a fact or that he 
establish the existence or nonexistence of a fact by a preponderance of the 
evidence, by clear and convincing proof, or by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
  Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof requires proof 
by a preponderance of the evidence. 
CAL. EVID. CODE § 115 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002). 
 377. See United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273–74 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(holding that the defendant’s knowledge of a plot to kill a witness and a failure to give a 
warning to the appropriate authorities is sufficient to constitute a waiver to the admission 
of hearsay evidence). 
 378. See United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1280 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 379. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 251 (1895).  In Mattox, a capital case, 
the judgment in the first trial was reversed and a second trial resulted in a hung jury.  In a 
third trial the accused was found guilty and sentenced to death.  Id. 
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the defendant’s right of confrontation.380 
During the course of its discussions, the Court balanced the 
defendant’s confrontation right against public policy considerations and 
the necessities of the case.381  The Court acknowledged, on the one hand, 
the safeguards embodied in the constitutional protection of 
confrontation, but found, on the other hand, that the rights of the people 
may, in certain cases, outweigh the need for these safeguards.382  The 
Court concluded that when the safety of the public is imperiled, and the 
rights of the accused are otherwise protected, “[a] technical adherence to 
the letter of a constitutional provision” is outweighed by the concern for 
public safety.383  Moreover, exceptions to the right of confrontation may 
be required by the necessities of a case in order “to prevent a manifest 
failure of justice.”384  In determining when an exception is required, the 
Court stated that public policy considerations, such as public safety 
and society’s interest in justice, should be weighed against the 
 
 380. Id. at 240–44, 251. 
 381. Id. at 243 (“But general rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in their 
operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of 
public policy and the necessities of the case.”). 
 382. Id. (“The law in its wisdom declares that the rights of the public shall not be 
wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused.”);  
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988) (“It is true that we have in the past indicated 
that rights conferred by the Confrontation Clause are not absolute, and may give way to 
other important interests.”); id. at 1021 (“We leave for another day whether any 
exceptions exist.  Whatever they may be, they would surely be allowed only when 
necessary to further an important public policy.”);  id. at 1025 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(“In short, our precedents recognize a right to face-to-face confrontation at trial, but have 
never viewed that right as absolute . . . . Thus, I would permit use of a particular trial 
procedure that called for something other than face-to-face confrontation if procedure 
was necessary to further an important public policy.”). 
The court, however, has recognized that competing interests, if “closely 
examined,”. . . may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial.  “General 
rules of law of this kind, however beneficent and valuable in their operation 
and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of 
public policy and the necessities of the case.” 
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 
243 (1895)); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (“Of course, 
the right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, 
bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.”).  
 383. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243. (“A technical adherence to the letter of a 
constitutional provision may occasionally be carried farther than is necessary to the just 
protection of the accused, and farther than the safety of the public will warrant.”). 
 384. Id. at 244 (“[Hearsay statements] are admitted . . . as an exception to such 
rules, simply from the necessities of the case, and to prevent a manifest failure of 
justice.”). 
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defendant’s right of confrontation.385  The Court concluded that such 
policy concerns may, in certain cases, outweigh the constitutional right 
of the defendant. 
As Justice Cardozo wrote: 
The law . . . is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever 
forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend.  Privileges so 
fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable 
to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however 
crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof.  But justice, though due to the 
accused, is due to the accuser also.  The concept of fairness must not be strained 
till it is narrowed to a filament.  We are to keep the balance true.386 
There are several public policy concerns in favor of nondisclosure.  
Building public confidence in our criminal justice system and 
maintaining an effective criminal justice system are both public policy 
goals of the highest order.387  Witness intimidation undermines the 
criminal justice system, erodes confidence in the government’s ability to 
protect its citizens, and degrades the integrity of the judicial process.388  
Nondisclosure of threatened witness identities would help to ameliorate 
these effects. 
Another public policy concern favoring nondisclosure is the 
encouragement of citizens to report their knowledge of criminal activity.  
Citizen cooperation is critically important to law enforcement.389  
 
 385. See id. at 242–44; Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990) (finding that 
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses must be interpreted in the context of 
the necessities of the trial, the adversary process, and with concern for public policy); id. 
at 849 (“In sum, our precedents establish that ‘the Confrontation Clause reflects a 
preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,’ . . . a preference that ‘must 
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.’”  
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted)); id. at 852 (“The critical inquiry in this 
case . . . is whether use of the procedure is necessary to further an important state 
interest.”); id. at 853 (“We likewise conclude today that a State’s interest in the physical 
and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to 
outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant’s right to face his or her accusers in 
court.”).  
[W]here necessary to protect a child witness from trauma that would be caused 
by testifying in the physical presence of the defendant, at least where such 
trauma would impair the child’s ability to communicate, the Confrontation 
Clause does not prohibit use of a procedure that, despite the absence of face-to-
face confrontation, ensures the reliability of the evidence by subjecting it to 
rigorous adversarial testing and thereby preserves the essence of effective 
confrontation. 
Id. at 857. 
 386. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934). 
 387. See Wallace v. City of Los Angeles, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113, 127 (Ct. App. 1993). 
 388. See Morgan v. Bennett, 204 F.3d 360, 367 (2d Cir. 2000); see also supra notes 
181–86 and accompanying text. 
 389. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 308 (1967); Lewis v. United States, 385 
U.S. 206, 210 & n.6 (1966); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59–60 (1957); United 
States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d 1384, 1391 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Toombs, 497 F.2d 
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Without citizen cooperation, the criminal justice system would grind to 
a halt.390  Such cooperation is thwarted, however, by community 
intimidation.391  Gang members commonly assault individuals in full 
view of other neighborhood residents in order to intimidate the residents 
and to dissuade them from reporting criminal activity to the police.392  
Respect in the gang subculture is often synonymous with fear.  
Retaliatory murders are committed to promote respect for the gang and 
intimidate those outside the gang.  This is well-known in the criminal 
justice system.393  If law enforcement fails to protect those who come 
forward with information about criminal activity even after they are 
attacked and threatened, other citizens will be discouraged from 
reporting future criminal activity.  Requiring disclosure of a threatened 
witness’s identity will weaken other citizens’ resolve to perform their 
civic and moral duty to report crime.  This result is contrary to the 
important policy goal of encouraging citizens to report crime.394 
Yet another public policy concern is the safety of witnesses who 
testify.  Disclosure of a witness’s identity to the defense after the witness 
has been attacked or threatened by the defendant exposes the witness to 
possibly lethal consequences.  There should be “a greater level of 
official concern and action promotive of witness safety” and “the long 
term result surely will be an increase in both the effectiveness of the 
criminal justice system and the level of public confidence in it.  The 
attainment of that result is certainly a public policy goal of very high 
priority.”395 
Our government also has a strong interest in assuring prospective 
witnesses that they will be free to attend trial to testify as a witness, 
without fear of intimidation or threats.396  Moreover, as will be shown, 
government has a duty and obligation to act in order to protect a 
witness’s constitutional right to testify.397 
By encouraging witnesses to report crime and to testify, nondisclosure 
 
88, 91–92 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Palermo, 410 F.2d 468, 472 (7th Cir. 1969). 
 390. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 679 (West 1999). 
 391. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 392. See People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 722 (Cal. 1996). 
 393. See People v. Olguin, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 611 (Ct. App. 1994). 
 394. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 308 (1967). 
 395. Wallace v. City of Los Angeles, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113, 127 (Ct. App. 1993). 
 396. See United States v. Pacelli, 491 F.2d 1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that 
the right to testify is one guaranteed by law). 
 397. See infra notes 433–39 and accompanying text. 
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also favors the important policy goal of effective law enforcement.  In 
the analogous case of confidential reliable informants, there is a 
government privilege to withhold the identity of persons who furnish 
information to police officers.  This privilege is meant to further and to 
protect the public interest in effective law enforcement.398  Usually, 
informants condition their cooperation on an assurance of anonymity to 
protect themselves and their families from harm.399  Law enforcement, in 
turn, depends greatly on information from informants in order to solve 
crimes.  Disclosing informants’ identities ends their usefulness to 
government and discourages others from cooperating.400  Furthermore, 
public policy forbids disclosure of confidential informants’ identities 
unless essential to the defense and material on the issue of guilt.401  But 
even in the case of confidential informants, there is no fixed rule as to 
disclosure, and decisions must be made “balancing the public interest in 
protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare 
his defense.”402  “Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous 
must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into 
consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible 
significance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors.”403 
Courts have long recognized the difficulty prosecutors and police have in 
obtaining witness cooperation when the witness’s life may be in danger.404 
 As our society becomes increasingly violent in its daily human interactions, 
more and more people are called upon to be witnesses in the prosecution of 
those causing the violence.  Yet, as the number of these potential witnesses 
grows, so also does the likelihood that they, or their families, will be subjected 
to violence by the very criminal defendants against whom they will give 
testimony.  Thus, the old phrase “violence begets violence” takes on a new 
 
 398. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957) (“The privilege recognizes 
the obligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes 
to law-enforcement officials and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to 
perform that obligation.”). 
 399. McCray, 386 U.S. at 308. 
 400. See id. at 308; Dep’t of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 179–81 (1993); 
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 208–10 (1966); United States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d 
1384, 1391 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Toombs, 497 F.2d 88, 94 (5th Cir. 1974); 
United States v. Twomey, 460 F.2d 400, 401–03 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Ellis, 
468 F.2d 638, 639 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Palermo, 410 F.2d 468, 472–73 (7th 
Cir. 1969). 
 401. See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938). 
 402. McCray, 386 U.S. at 310 (quoting Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62); id. at 312 (“In 
sum, the Court in the exercise of its power to formulate evidentiary rules for federal 
criminal cases has consistently declined to hold that an informer’s identity need always 
be disclosed in a federal criminal trial . . . .”).   
 403. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62. 
 404. Palermo, 410 F.2d at 472 (“This Court is not unaware of the problem that the 
government has in obtaining witnesses in cases where a witness’ life may be in jeopardy 
if he testifies.”); see also Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d 203, 222 (Cal. 2000). 
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meaning.  The threat to the safety of these witnesses is very real, especially 
when the defendant has gang or drug trafficking affiliations.  Unfortunately, the 
lack of safeguards for such witnesses is also very real. 
 Society reaps enormous benefits when a witness’s testimony succeeds in 
getting a criminal off the streets and placed behind bars.  Society must be 
willing to pay for that benefit by affording necessary protection to both the 
witness and his family, for the threat of violence against a witness’s family will 
often silence the witness. Without a continuing and visible public commitment 
to such protection, it is unrealistic to expect citizens to come forward and 
provide the information so critical to the successful operation of the criminal 
justice system.  To the extent that government fails to meet this essential 
responsibility, it cedes control of our cities to the criminals. 
 If the result which we reach in the case before us brings about a greater 
level of official concern and action promotive of witness safety, and an 
appropriate devotion of public resources to that end, the long term result surely 
will be an increase in both the effectiveness of the criminal justice system and 
the level of public confidence in it.  The attainment of that result is certainly a 
public policy goal of very high priority.405 
Indeed, several courts have found that where there is a threat to the 
life of a witness, the right of the defendant to have the witness’s true 
name, address, and other personal information is not absolute.406  Thus, 
the public has a great interest in effective law enforcement and the 
government, in turn, recognizes that citizens have an obligation to 
inform law enforcement of criminal activity that is within their 
knowledge.407  Preserving their anonymity, when possible, encourages 
citizens to perform their obligation.408  Justice O’Connor recently opined 
that “[m]ost people would think that witnesses to a gang-related murder 
likely would be unwilling to speak to the [FBI] except on the condition 
of confidentiality.”409 
Finally, there is a strong public interest in blocking an accused’s 
attempt to subvert the criminal prosecution by threatening or attacking 
material witnesses who have information which inculpates the accused.  
This is misconduct of the highest order, detrimental to the ability of 
government to carry out its duties and obligations to prosecute crime and 
to protect its citizens.  “[T]he first duty of government by consent [is] 
maintenance of the public order.”  The government has an obligation not 
 
 405. Wallace v. City of Los Angeles, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113, 126–27 (Ct. App. 1993). 
 406. See, e.g., Palermo, 410 F.2d at 472; United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 
1356 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Rangel, 534 F.2d 147, 148 (9th Cir. 1976); 
United States v. Ellis, 468 F.2d 638, 639 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Twomey, 460 
F.2d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 1972). 
 407. See Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 59. 
 408. Id. 
 409. Dep’t of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 179 (1993). 
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only “‘to promote the interest of all, [but] to prevent the wrongdoing of 
one resulting in injury to the general welfare.’”410 
Thus, in this narrow circumstance, when a defendant is responsible for 
the threats or attacks which cause a witness to fear for his life, 
competing public policy interests warrant dispensing with the 
defendant’s right to know that witness’s identity.411  The necessities of 
this fact situation override the defendant’s right to know the witness’s 
identity.412 
3. Equitable Principles Weigh in Favor of Nondisclosure 
The equitable doctrine that “no one shall be permitted to take 
advantage of his own wrong” is “based on the principles of common 
honesty.”413  The primary purpose of the waiver by misconduct doctrine 
is to prevent a wrongdoer from profitting in a court of law by reason of 
his misdeeds.414  A defendant may not claim a violation of his 
constitutional rights when his own misconduct created the violation.  
Not only would it be unfair and morally wrong to allow one to use 
dishonest means to attain a legal advantage, it would create an incentive 
for others to so act.415  Thus, one who intimidates or attacks a witness to 
prevent that witness from testifying should not be allowed to assert a 
denial of his right of confrontation based on the prosecution’s intent to 
withhold the identity of that witness, because the witness’s fear and 
threatened status is due to the defendant’s acts and threats.  The waiver 
doctrine provides in those circumstances that the defendant “cannot 
insist on his privilege,” since by his own wrongful conduct he has 
waived his confrontation rights as to that witness.416 
In considering a defendant who asserted a constitutional violation 
because his trial proceeded during his voluntary absence, the United 
States Supreme Court stated the following: 
 
 410. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 605 (Cal. 1997) (quoting In re 
Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 584 (1895)). 
 411. Cf. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (Thus in certain narrow 
circumstances “competing interests, if ‘closely examined,’ . . . may warrant dispensing 
with confrontation at trial.” (citation omitted)); accord Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 
U.S. 284, 295 (1973); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487 
U.S. 1012, 1020–21 (1988). 
 412. A preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial “must occasionally give 
way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.”  Mattox v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895); accord Craig, 497 U.S. at 849. 
 413. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 159 (1878). 
 414. United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1282–83 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 415. See id. at 1280 (“Not allowing the statement of a witness made before charges 
were filed would serve as a prod to the unscrupulous to accelerate the time table and 
murder suspected snitches sooner rather than later.”). 
 416. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158; accord Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242. 
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 The question is one of broad public policy, whether an accused person, 
placed upon trial for crime and protected by all the safeguards with which the 
humanity of our present criminal law sedulously surrounds him, can with 
impunity defy the processes of that law, paralyze the proceedings of courts and 
juries and turn them into a solemn farce, and ultimately compel society, for its 
own safety, to restrict the operation of the principle of personal liberty.  Neither 
in criminal nor in civil cases will the law allow a person to take advantage of his 
own wrong.417 
The doctrine of waiver by misconduct protects the integrity of the 
adversary process by deterring attempts by defendants to prevent the 
testimony of adverse witnesses.418  The waiver doctrine is somewhat 
similar to the equitable doctrine of clean hands, that one cannot 
complain of a wrong committed by another while he himself is guilty of 
having committed wrongful acts.419  To attack, or threaten a material 
witness in order to prevent that witness’s testimony at trial, and yet 
demand disclosure of the witness’s identity based on the claim of a 
constitutional right to that knowledge, is more egregious because the 
alleged violation is created by the one who would assert it.  The law will 
not sanction the practice of threatening witnesses and should not permit 
such conduct to benefit the defendant.420 
As stated earlier, the central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to 
provide a procedure which will insure the reliability of the evidence 
offered against a defendant.  But the “Sixth Amendment does not stand 
as a shield to protect the accused from his own misconduct or 
chicanery.”421  When a defendant’s misconduct violates the heart of the 
procedure put in place to protect his rights, he should not be afforded the 
protection of the Clause.422  In other words, the accused should not be 
permitted to assert a denial of his confrontation rights when refused the 
identity of the witness, when he himself was the instrument and cause of 
the denial.423  When confrontation becomes impossible due to the very 
person who would assert that right, equity should intervene to provide 
 
 417. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 458 (1912) (quoting Falk v. United States, 
15 App. D.C. 446, 460 (1899)). 
 418. Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 419. Id. 
 420. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 421. United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Carlson, 
547 F.2d at 1359). 
 422. See Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1359. 
 423. See United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States 
v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 652 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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that the right has been waived.424 
Just as a defendant who has removed an adverse witness through 
murder is in no position to complain about losing the chance to cross-
examine the witness,425 so is the defendant in a weak position to 
complain about not knowing a witness’s identity when he is the cause of 
possible lethal consequences feared by the witness.  Withholding the 
witness’s identity partially offsets the harm caused by the defendant’s 
wrongful actions.426  A contrary rule would serve as an incentive to 
perpetuate this type of wrongful conduct.427 
The Confrontation Clause was meant to protect against the use of 
anonymous accusers; however, anonymous accusers originally referred 
to individuals who signed declarations, did not attend trial, did not swear 
to the truth of their statements, and did not face the triers of fact or the 
defendant.  The situation is quite different where a crucial witness’s 
identity is withheld but the witness does attend trial, does swear to tell 
the truth, does testify before the trier of fact and the defendant, face-to-
face, and is subject to cross-examination.  Thus, even if the witness is 
unnamed, the witness is not anonymous in the sense of the Star Chamber 
declarants.  The witness, unlike those declarants, is subject to cross-
examination and has been the subject of whatever discovery is available.  
As an alternative, an independent third attorney and investigator could 
be appointed by the court and given the witness’s identity.  That team 
could investigate the witness’s background and report its findings only 
to the defense, but not the witness’s name, and in this way, a barrier is 
provided to prevent accidental dissemination of the witness’s identity. 
Simple equity, therefore, also supports the conclusion that the accused 
may not assert a violation of his confrontation rights as to that witness’s 
identity.  Just as the Clause was designed to protect against the dangers 
of untested testimony by anonymous accusers, the waiver doctrine is 
designed to protect against the dangers of misconduct by the accused.  
By such misconduct an accused may forfeit the protections afforded 
under the Clause and allow the nondisclosure of a witness’s identity.428  
In construing the balance, the main interest that must be offset against 
the government’s need to withhold the witness’s identity is the accused’s 
right of confrontation.  “Once the confrontation right is lifted from the 
 
 424. See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 425. See White, 116 F.3d at 911; Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 652. 
 426. See White, 116 F.3d at 911. 
 427. See Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 652. 
 428. See United States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d 1384, 1391–92 (5th Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Rangel, 534 
F.2d 147, 148 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Ellis, 468 F.2d 638, 639 (9th Cir. 1972); 
United States v. Jordan, 466 F.2d 99, 101–02 (4th Cir. 1972).   
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scales by operation of the accused’s waiver of that right, the balance tips 
sharply in favor” of the protection of the witness’s identity.429 
The law simply cannot countenance a defendant deriving benefits 
from murdering the chief witness against him.  To permit such 
subversion of a criminal prosecution “would be contrary to public 
policy, common sense, and the underlying purpose of the confrontation 
clause,”. . . and make a mockery of the system of justice that the right 
was designed to protect.430 
Once the defendant has waived his right of confrontation by 
misconduct, he has a fortiori waived his right of cross-examination.  
Thus, he has waived his right to know the witness’s identity.  The law 
has never countenanced piecemeal waivers; thus, a waiver by 
misconduct would be a waiver as to all aspects of the right.431   
4. Balancing of Witness’s Rights Against Those of the Defendant 
Weighs in Favor of Nondisclosure 
Yet another factor weighs in favor of nondisclosure: on balance, the 
rights of witnesses outweigh those of the accused.  Cases that discuss the 
issue of nondisclosure fail to also discuss the rights, duties, and 
obligations of witnesses.  In fact, not much is written about the 
obligations society and the law place on those who, through 
happenstance, become crucial witnesses in criminal prosecutions.432  It is 
 
 429. See United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1281 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that 
the balance tips in favor of the need for evidence once the defendant waives his right of 
confrontation); Thevis, 665 F.2d at 632–33 (stating that once the defendant’s interest in 
confrontation is removed by waiver, the balance tips in favor of the need for evidence).     
 430. United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Thevis, 665 F.2d at 630 (quoting United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 
1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976))); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 
1982); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 431. See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 452–53 (1912) (“As here the accused, 
by his voluntary act, placed in evidence the testimony disclosed by the record in 
question, and thereby sought to obtain an advantage from it, he waived his right of 
confrontation as to that testimony and cannot now complain of its consideration.”); 
United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1281 
(“[Defendants’] misconduct waived not only their confrontation rights but also their 
hearsay objections, thus rendering a special finding of reliability superfluous.”); United 
States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992) (“A defendant who procures a witness’s 
absence waives the right of confrontation for all purposes with regard to that witness, not 
just to the admission of sworn hearsay statements.”); Thevis, 665 F.2d at 630 (“[W]aiver 
of . . . confrontation [necessarily includes] a waiver of any hearsay objection.”). 
 432. Under the law, crime victims and witnesses have a civil and moral duty to 
cooperate with law enforcement and prosecutors in the prosecution of criminal cases.  
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interesting that none of these cases discuss the constitutional rights of 
affected witnesses, even though that discussion is important to any 
balancing test.  Therefore, in order to balance the accused’s rights as to 
those threatened witnesses, it is essential to examine the rights granted to 
crime victims and witnesses. 
Since 1895, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
citizens have not only a civic duty to report crime, but a constitutional 
right to do so.433  Admittedly, there is no language in the Constitution 
which specifically grants that right, but the right is intrinsic to, and arises 
from, the very creation and establishment of our government, and as 
such, is a right secured to all by the Constitution.434   
Government, in turn, has an important interest in the public health and 
safety of its citizens.  Under its parens patriae powers, it also has a duty 
to care for its citizens.  And, under its police powers, government has an 
obligation and duty to protect its citizens from the criminal tendencies of 
others.435  Anyone who conspires to violate a citizen’s right to report 
crime is subject to punishment.436  In that regard, government has a 
corresponding duty to protect citizens from violence occasioned by the 
exercise of their right to report crime.437  “By entering society, 
 
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 679 (West 1999); see also In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535–36 
(1895) (“It is . . . [a citizen’s] right and his duty to communicate to the executive officers 
any information which he has of the commission of an offence against those laws; and 
such information, given by a private citizen, is a privileged and confidential 
communication . . . .”); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957) (“The privilege 
[to withhold a confidential informant’s identity] recognizes the obligation of citizens to 
communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement officials 
and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to perform that obligation.”); see 
also United States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d 1384, 1391 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Toombs, 497 F.2d 88, 92 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 433. Quarles, 158 U.S. at 536 (“The right of a citizen informing of a violation of 
law . . . does not depend upon any of the Amendments to the Constitution, but arises out 
of the creation and establishment by the Constitution itself of a national government, 
paramount and supreme within its sphere of action.”). 
 434. Id. at 536–37 (“The necessary conclusion is, that it is the right of every private 
citizen of the United States to inform a marshal . . . of a violation of the . . . laws of the 
United States; that this right is secured to the citizen by the Constitution of the United 
States . . . .”).  
 435. ‘Parens patriae’ literally, ‘parent of the country’ refers traditionally to the 
role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under a legal disability to 
act for themselves. . . . Recently, the doctrine has been used to allow the state 
to recover damages to quasi-sovereign contracts wholly apart from recoverable 
injuries to individuals residing within the state.  These quasi-sovereign 
interests have included the health, comfort and welfare of the people . . . .   
West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1971); see also 
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554–60 (1966). 
 436. See Quarles, 158 U.S. at 538 (“[A] conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten, or 
intimidate him in the free exercise or enjoyment of this right, or because of his having 
exercised it, is punishable . . . .”).  
 437. Id. at 536 (“[I]t is the duty of that government to see that he may exercise this 
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individuals give up the unrestrained right to act as they think fit; in 
return, each has a positive right to society’s protection.”  Montesquieu 
describes this civil liberty as “that tranquillity of spirit which comes 
from the opinion each one has of his security, and in order for him to 
have this liberty the government must be such that one citizen cannot 
fear another citizen.”438 
Citizens also have a duty to assist in prosecuting and securing the 
punishment of those who violate the law.439  Furthermore, citizens have 
a duty to testify in criminal prosecutions.440  In fact, if an individual is a 
material witness in a criminal prosecution, and refuses to appear in 
court, the law provides for the arrest and incarceration of that person 
until trial.441 
Because citizens have a constitutional duty to report criminal activity 
and assist in its prosecution, it follows axiomatically that citizens have a 
constitutional right to testify at trial.  As the Quarles court observed, the 
right of a “private citizen . . . [to] assis[t] in putting in motion the course 
of justice” and the right “to act as part of the posse comitatus in 
upholding the laws” of this country, are secured by the Constitution.442  
Because prosecuting criminal cases involves trials and trial testimony, it 
necessarily follows that a witness has a constitutional right to testify at 
those trials.443  The government has the duty to protect its citizens’ right 
 
right freely, and to protect him from violence while so doing, or on account of so 
doing.”). 
 438. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 603 (Cal. 1997) (quoting 
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157 (1889)). 
 439. Quarles, 158 U.S. at 535. 
It is the duty and the right, not only of every peace officer of the United States, 
but of every citizen, to assist in prosecuting, and in securing the punishment of, 
any breach of the peace of the United States.  It is the right, as well as the duty, 
of every citizen . . . to act as part of the posse comitatus in upholding the laws 
of his country. 
Id.; see also Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 600 (1896); Roviaro v. United States, 353 
U.S. 53, 59 (1957). 
 440. Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961) (“Every citizen of 
course owes to his society the duty of giving testimony to aid in the enforcement of the 
law.”); see also Brown, 161 U.S. at 600. 
 441. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 881 (West 1985 & Supp. 2002); id. § 1332 (West 
1982 & Supp. 2002).   
 442. Quarles, 158 U.S. at 535–36. 
 443. See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 626 (5th Cir. 1982) (“We conclude, 
therefore, that Quarles implicitly overruled Sanges, and the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
controls this case.  Thus we hold that the right to testify at trial is one secured by the 
Constitution . . . .”). 
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to testify and to guard against any interference with this right by 
violence or intimidation.444 
Government’s duty to protect witnesses in criminal prosecutions arises 
for several reasons.  First, acts of violence and threats of violence are not 
protected by the Constitution.445  Second, fear for one’s own safety or 
the safety of his family does not legally excuse a witness from his duty 
to testify.446  Third, it would be unconscionable for government to 
impose duties and obligations on its citizenry, exposing them to the 
possibility of harm or danger, and then fail to assist them.  Finally, 
individuals who perform their civic duty benefit society and, in turn, 
have a right to society’s protection.447  Even prisoners in custody have a 
constitutional right to be protected against violence committed against 
them while in custody, and government has a corresponding duty to 
protect them against assault or injury.448 
In summary, witnesses have a constitutional right to report whatever 
knowledge they have of criminal activity to law enforcement, to assist 
with its prosecution, and to testify at trial.  An accused has a 
constitutional right to confront his accusers and have them testify in 
court before the trier of fact.  When an accused threatens or attacks a 
witness, he has not only waived this right, but has violated the 
constitutional rights of that witness in an attempt to obtain an advantage 
for himself.  Thus, he has committed another crime—a violation of that 
witness’s rights.  He has also impliedly verified the witness’s 
prospective testimony else the attack or threat would make no sense. 
 
 444. See Quarles, 158 U.S. at 536 (“[I]t is the duty of that government to see that he 
may exercise this right freely, and to protect him from violence while so doing, or on 
account of so doing.” (quoting Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662 (1884))); see also 
Piemonte, 367 U.S. at 559 n.2 (“Every citizen of course owes to his society the duty of 
giving testimony to aid in the enforcement of the law . . . .  The Government of course 
has an obligation to protect its citizens from harm.” (citations omitted)). 
 445. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993); Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 
609, 628 (1984). 
 446. Piemonte, 367 U.S. at 559 n.2 (“Neither before the Court of Appeals nor here 
was fear for himself or his family urged by Piemonte as a valid excuse from testifying.  
Nor would this be a legal excuse.  Every citizen of course owes to his society the duty of 
giving testimony to aid in the enforcement of the law.” (emphasis added)). 
 447. See Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662 (1884); Quarles, 158 U.S. at 536; 
see also 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000) (making criminal a conspiracy “to injure, oppress, 
threaten, or intimidate [any citizen] in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or 
privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . .”). 
 448. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 284 (1892). 
The United States, having the absolute right to hold such prisoners, have an 
equal duty to protect them, while so held, against assault or injury from any 
quarter.  The existence of that duty on the part of the government necessarily 
implies a corresponding right of the prisoners to be so protected; and this right 
of the prisoners is a right secured to them by the Constitution . . . . 
Id. 
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By virtue of the threat facing the witness, and the defendant’s ability 
to have that threat realized, the witness under current law can be placed 
in a witness protection program.449  That placement results in the loss of 
those constitutional rights granted to all citizens, such as freedom of 
association,450 which includes the creation and sustenance of a family, 
marriage, educating and raising children, and cohabitation with one’s 
relatives;451 the right to life and liberty;452 the right to freedom of 
personal choice in the matters of family life;453 the right to freely travel; 
the right to establish one’s home and move about at will;454 the right to 
contract and engage in any of the common occupations of life; and the 
right to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.455 
Loss of these rights are significant, especially to one who has not 
committed a wrong and who has performed his or her moral and civic 
duty.  In reality, the stakes are as high, if not higher, for the threatened 
witness as for the accused.  The accused in a noncapital case faces 
incarceration and loss of liberty.  The witness, who is innocent of any 
crime, is facing the real possibility of loss of life to himself or herself or 
a loved one, and the loss of freedom to live his or her chosen life, 
associate with their friends and family, and work at his or her chosen 
profession. 
Furthermore, a program’s protection may be for a limited period of 
time.  For example, placement in California’s witness protection 
program is only for six months, with an outside limit of nine months if 
 
 449. The Alvarado court acknowledged the serious nature and magnitude of the 
problem of witness intimidation, and that it is crucial for government to provide 
protection to those witnesses.  Yet the court admitted that none of the procedures in 
place, including the witness protection program, can guarantee the safety of a witness, 
but only help to reduce the risks the witness faces.  This is borne out by the fact that 
every day government forgoes prosecution in many cases where evidence essential to the 
defense would jeopardize a witness’s life.  Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d 203, 
222–23 (Cal. 2000). 
 450. See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 617–19. 
 451. Id. 
 452. See Logan, 144 U.S. at 287; People v. Olivas, 551 P.2d 375, 384 (Cal. 1976). 
 453. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976). 
 454. Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–20 (1984); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 
U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976); Aptheker v. 
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1969). 
 455. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922); see also Jaycees, 468 U.S. 
at 622. 
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necessary.456  That exposes the individual to retaliatory acts when the 
protection ends.  It is important to remember the words of our Supreme 
Court, that “justice though due to the accused, is due to the accuser 
also.”457 
The public has an interest in the fair administration of justice, the 
conviction of those who are guilty and the adjudication of criminal trials 
in a setting which promotes confidence in the adversary process.458  The 
courts are charged with protecting the public interest by giving the 
prosecution a fair opportunity to prove its cases against those who have 
violated the law.459  The public has an important interest that trials be 
fair and that they result in a just judgment.460  One who jeopardizes these 
interests truly jeopardizes the very structure of society. 
Although already stated, the following is worth repeating: 
 Society reaps enormous benefits when a witness’s testimony succeeds in 
getting a criminal off the street and placed behind bars.  Society must be willing 
to pay for that benefit by affording necessary protection to both the witness and 
his family, for the threat of violence against a witness’s family will often silence 
the witness.  Without a continuing and visible public commitment to such 
protection, it is unrealistic to expect citizens to come forward and provide 
information so critical to the successful operation of the criminal justice system.  
To the extent that government fails to meet this essential responsibility, it cedes 
control of our cities to the criminals.461 
State legislatures as well recognize that all individuals have a right “to 
be secure and protected from fear, intimidation, and physical harm 
caused by the activities of violent groups and individuals.”462  When 
confrontation becomes a problem because of a defendant’s action, logic 
dictates that the innocent person should not be the one who suffers.  The 
Sixth Amendment is meant to protect the accused from overreaching by 
the government, not from his own misdeeds.463 Therefore, when the 
witnesses’ rights, duties, and obligations are balanced against the 
defendant’s right of confrontation, the moral equation tips in favor of the 
witness. 
The President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime found such a serious 
imbalance between the rights of crime victims and the rights of criminal 
defendants, that it proposed an amendment to the United States 
Constitution to provide crime victims with “the right to be present and to 
 
 456. CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 306, at 9. 
 457. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934). 
 458. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 231 (1975). 
 459. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1949). 
 460. See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1948). 
 461. Wallace v. City of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113, 127 (Ct. App. 1983). 
 462. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (West 1999); id. § 11410 (West 2000). 
 463. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1357–58 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings.”464  Just recently, 
President Bush and other members of the government have also called 
for a “constitutional amendment to protect the rights of violent-crime 
victims” because “the 8 million victims of violent crime each year have 
too often had their rights ignored in the criminal justice system.”465  The 
amendment was characterized as “the right thing to do” because “too 
often . . . the rights of these victims have been overlooked or ignored.”466 
Attorney General Ashcroft opined: “It is time—it is past time—to 
balance the scales of justice, to demand fairness and judicial integrity not 
just for the accused but for the aggrieved as well.”467 As proposed, the 
amendment would have seven procedural rights for violent crime 
victims, including “the right to have their safety considered.”468 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Waiver by misconduct should apply in cases of witness intimidation 
and witness attacks.  Application of the doctrine is consistent with the 
principle that the right of cross-examination may be limited for reasons 
of public policy, witness safety, or because of the necessities of the 
case.469 As shown, applying the waiver doctrine is equitable, promotive 
of several important public policies, and justified by the weighing of the 
rights of the witness against those of the defendant.470 
 Due process of law requires that the proceedings shall be fair, but fairness is a 
relative, not an absolute concept.  It is fairness with reference to particular conditions 
or particular results.  “The due process clause does not impose upon the States a duty 
to establish ideal systems for the administration of justice, with every modern 
improvement and with provision against every possible hardship that may befall.”  
What is fair in one set of circumstances may be an act of tyranny in others.471 
 
 464. Dean G. Kilpatrick et al., The Rights of Crime Victims—Does Legal Protection 
Make a Difference?, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE, Dec. 1998, at 1;  see President’s Task Force 
on Victims of Crime Final Report, WASHINGTON, D.C. 114 (Dec. 1982). 
 465. Eric Lichtblau, Victims’ Bill Gets Backing, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2002, at A10. 
 466. Id. 
 467. Id. 
 468. Id. (emphasis added). 
 469. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 
(1895). 
 470. See Clark v. Ricketts, 958 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Fuentes, 988 F. Supp. 861, 866 (E.D. Pa. 1997); United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735, 
750 (7th Cir. 1969). 
 471. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116–17 (1934) (quoting Ownbey v. 
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When confrontation becomes impossible due to actions committed by 
the one who would assert that right, and would benefit thereby, logic 
dictates that the right has been waived.472  Else, a defendant can, with 
impunity, threaten or attack a witness.  If suppression of the witness’s 
identification is deemed a confrontation violation, then the following 
scenarios result: the witness refuses to testify and the defendant achieves 
his purpose of preventing the admission of relevant, material, and crucial 
evidence before the trier of fact and the criminal prosecution is 
dismissed; or, he learns the identity of the witness which thus enables 
the initial threat to be executed; or, the witness testifies, enters a witness 
protection program for a limited time and forfeits his or her 
constitutional rights, including those the defendant has violated, and 
when out of the program is still subject to retaliatory attacks.  In each 
scenario, the defendant benefits from his wrongful conduct and is 
allowed to misuse the very process of the court and adversary system put 
in place for his protection, for malicious ends and in violation of the 
dictates of Reynolds, Mattox, and Diaz.473  This cannot and should not be 
the law. 
The Court has consistently refused to set a fixed rule as to when 
disclosure is required.474  Thus, it is appropriate to interpret Smith as not 
requiring disclosure of witness identity in all cases, and certainly not in 
the case of the threatened witness who does not have the credibility 
issues present in Alvarado.475 
Furthermore, even though the Smith Court found that “when the 
credibility of a witness is in issue, the very starting point in ‘exposing 
falsehoods and bringing out the truth’ through cross-examination must 
necessarily be to ask the witness who he is and where he lives,”476 Smith 
did not involve a threatened witness, and did involve a witness with 
credibility issues.477 At trial, the prosecutor did not provide the Court 
with any reason which might have justified the refusal to provide the 
witness’s name and address.478 Nor did the Smith Court say that such 
 
Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110 (1921)). 
 472. See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 473. See id. (“To permit such subversion of a criminal prosecution . . . [would] 
make a mockery of the system of justice that the right was designed to protect.”). 
 474. See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 310–11 (1967); Roviaro v. United 
States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957). 
 475. United States v. Rangel, 534 F.2d 147, 148 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that Smith 
“does not establish a rigid rule of disclosure, but rather discusses disclosure against a 
background of factors weighing conversely such as personal safety of the witness”); see 
also Siegfriedt v. Fair, 982 F.2d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 
1352, 1355 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 476. Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131 (1968). 
 477. Id. at 130. 
 478. Id. at 134 (White, J., concurring). 
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disclosure was required in all cases under all circumstances.  In fact, the 
Court affirmed that a trial court has a duty to protect witnesses from 
certain questions,479 including those which “endanger the personal safety 
of the witness.”480 
The Court has often noted that exceptions to the Sixth Amendment 
privilege may be enlarged from time to time, as long as the exceptions 
are consistent with the spirit of the law.481  The purpose of the Clause is 
the promotion of the integrity of the trial process and its truth seeking 
function, and the administration of justice.  Waiver by misconduct is 
consistent with this aim, because it penalizes those who attempt to 
subvert the trial process and undermine the integrity of the criminal 
prosecution. 
Furthermore, “cross-examination is not improperly curtailed if the 
[trier of fact] is in possession of facts sufficient to make a 
‘discriminating appraisal’ of the particular witness’s credibility.”482 As 
stated earlier, cross-examination is used to impeach credibility and 
expose witness bias, if any.  “So long as a reasonably complete picture 
of the witness’s veracity, bias and motivation is developed,” 
appropriate boundaries of cross-examination may be set.483  Certainly 
the prosecution can provide all necessary discovery relevant to the 
protected witness’s credibility to the defense without disclosing that 
witness’s identity.484 
 
 479. Smith, 390 U.S. at 133. 
 480. Id. at 133–34 (White, J., concurring); see also Clark v. Ricketts, 958 F.2d 851, 
855 (9th Cir. 1992); Varella, 692 F.2d at 1355 (“A well-recognized limitation on the 
right to cross-examine a witness occurs when a disclosure of the information sought 
would endanger the physical safety of the witness or his family.”); United States v. 
Twomey, 460 F.2d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Ellis, 468 F.2d 638, 639 
(9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Palermo, 410 F.2d 468, 472 (7th Cir. 1969) (“[W]here 
there is a threat to the life of the witness, the right of the defendant to have the witness’ 
true name, address and place of employment is not absolute.”). 
 481. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934) (“The exceptions are not 
even static, but may be enlarged from time to time, if there is no material departure from 
the reason of the general rule.”). 
 482. United States v. Sasso, 59 F.2d 341, 347 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 483. United States v. McLaughlin, 957 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 484. This should not be interpreted to imply that defense counsel cannot be trusted 
with that information.  Rather, it is life’s experience that dissemination of information 
occurs in many ways, deliberate and accidental.  Many people have access to confidential 
information which is being transcribed, copied, or left on a desk.  People other than a 
defense attorney have access to defense materials as a necessary part of the working 
process, such as investigators, paralegals, clerks, typists, and messengers.  Thus, once the 
information is given out, it may accidentally arrive in the wrong hands. 
FINALCASSANI2.DOC 2/4/2020 12:58 PM 
1242 
If this is not an acceptable solution, then the trial court could appoint 
an independent attorney and investigator, who would be given the 
identification information and then create their own discovery on the 
credibility of that protected witness.  That information would then be 
turned over to the defense team so that, at least, an added layer of 
protection would prevent disclosure of the witness’s identity. 
One judge said that we cannot expect jurors to take their chances on 
what might happen to them as a result of a guilty verdict.485  Neither 
should witnesses be expected to take a chance on what might happen to 
them if they testify. 
Principles of morality, culpability, and responsibility are the heart 
of criminal jurisprudence.486  The Sixth Amendment was not intended 
and “does not stand as a shield to protect an accused from his own 
[misdeeds].”487 Just as a defendant who murders a witness to prevent 
that witness from testifying ought not be permitted to invoke the right 
of confrontation to prohibit the use of the witness’s hearsay 
statement,488 a defendant should not be afforded the protection of the 
Clause if he makes the identification of a witness an invitation to 
murder.  As one wise Justice stated, there is the danger that “if the 
Court does not temper its . . . logic, with a little practical wisdom, it 
will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”489 
 To hold that the liberty of [individuals] . . . must be forfeited to preserve the 
illusion of freedom for those whose ill conduct is deleterious to the community 
as a whole is to ignore half the political promise of the Constitution and the 
whole of its sense.  The freedom to leave one’s house and move about at will, 
and to have a measure of personal security is “implicit in ‘the concept of 
ordered liberty’” enshrined in the history and basic constitutional documents of 
English-speaking people.  Preserving the peace is the first duty of government, 
and it is for the protection of the community from predations of the idle, the 
contentious and the brutal that government was invented.490 
Witness intimidation raises concern not just for the well being of the 
targeted individual, but for the entire judicial process.  Those concerns 
justify a limitation of the defendant’s rights where the government’s 
obligation to maintain order in society is at stake.491 
485. United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1364 (1985).
486. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 n.4 (1951).
487. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985); see Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 458 
(1912). 
488. See Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1359.
489. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
490. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 928 P.2d 596, 618 (Cal. 1997) (citing Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949)). 
491. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895); Diaz v. United States,
223 U.S. 442, 460 (1912); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116–17, 122 (1934). 
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The beyond a reasonable doubt standard reflects the value society 
places on individual freedom and the immense importance it places on 
an individual’s life and liberty.492  Is it not also true that the same value, 
the same concern, and the same consideration should apply to the life 
and liberty of witnesses and victims, who willingly perform their civic 
duty, risk their lives, and assist in the apprehension and prosecution of 
criminal activities?  Are not their lives and their right to freedom just as 
valuable, just as precious?  And if not, why not? 
492. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
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VII. APPENDIX
CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM 
Attachment 1 CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM 
Witness Advisement 
Per Section 14025, Title 7.5 of the California Penal Code, the Witness Advisement shall be in writing and 
shall specify the responsibilities of the protected person that establish the conditions for the CWPP. 
District Attorney's Office: ________ Contract Number: _____ _ 
Witness Name and I. D. Number: _________________ _ 
The protected person/witness shall agree to all of the following: 
I, _______ _, do hereby agree to do all of the below conditions while in the California 
(print name) 
Witness Protection Program. 
► testify truthfully in and provide all necessary information to appropriate law enforcement officials 
concerning all criminal proceedings(_ witness initials); 
► obey all laws L witness initials); 
► take all necessary steps to avoid detection by others d111ing the period of protection 
L witness initials); 
► comply with all legal obligations and civil judgments L_ witness intitials ); 
► cooperate with all reasonable requests from officials providing the protection 
L_ witness initials); 
► disclose all outstanding legal obligations, including those concerning child custody and visitation 
rights L witness initials); 
► disclose any probation or parole responsibilities L witness initials); and 
► regularly infonn the appropriate district attorney's office or law enforcement designee of his/her 
activities and c111rent address (_ witness initials). 
► Fail111e to comply with any of the above may be a condition for tennination from the program 
L witness initials). 
____________ (<ii signature) 
Witness Date 
I have explained each of the above conditions to the witness, and he/she has acknowledged and agreed to 
all of the conditions. 
____________ (<ii signature) 
District Attorney Designee Date 
CWPP 3 (12/99) 
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CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM 
Attachment 2 CALIFORNIA WITN ESS PROTECTION PROGRAM 
APPLICATION 
STA TE OF CALIFORNIA Mail to California Department of Justice 
California Bureau of Investigation/CWPP 
P.O. Box 163029 
Date 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION 
PROGRAM 
APPLICATION 
Sacram ento, CA 958 16-3029 
A ttn: CWPP Program Analyst 
I. REQUESTING DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE/WITNESS COORDINATOR 
District Attorney's Office District Attorney Representative 
Office Nameffitle 
Business Address A ddress 
Phone #: Phone #: 
Agen cy Case #: Investigating Officer: 
II. CASE INFORMATION 
Briefly describe the case in which the witness is testifying; and explain h ow it constitutes a gang-related 
crim e, organized crime, narcotic trafficking crllne, or some other crime that creates a high degree of risk 
to the witness. If possible, attach the crim e repor t If m ore room is n ecessary, please type on additional 
page and attach 
Has a complaint or indictment been filed, or does the submitting agency intend to seek a complaint or indictment? 
Yes 1 No 1 
Court Case# Case Nam e: 
----------------- -----------
Defendants Being DOB CII Charges Filed Custody 
Prosecuted Yes/No 
III. THREAT INFORMATION 
Articulate the credible ev idence of a substantial danger the w itness may suffer due to intimidation or 
r etaliatory v iolence. 
CWPP I (12/99) (Page I of2) 
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CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM 
IV. WITNESSINFORMATION 





List family, friends, or associates who will also be protected: 
NAME DOB RELATIONSHIP TO WITNESS 
V. WITNESS ASSISTANCENEEDED 
Period of time assistance needed (six-month limit): Beginning date: ____ Ending date : ___ _ 
Essential Expenses Requested: Financial Assistance Received by Witness 
Relocation :$ Salary $ Imo. 
Motel :$ ___ /days for __ days Child Support $ __ Imo. 
Meals :$ ___ /days for __ days Disability $ __ Imo. 
Incidentals :$ ___ /days for __ days Welfare $ --Imo. 
Apartment :$ ___ /mo. for mos. Other ( explain) $ __ Imo. 
Meals :$ ___ Imo. for mos Total Amount: $ 
Utilities :$ Imo. for m os. 
Incidentals :$ Imo. for mos. 
Deposits :$ Monthly Debts $ __ Imo. 
Other ( explain) :$ /mo. for m os. 
Total Amount :$ 
Were other available funding sources utilized before applying to the CWPP? Yes i No i 
Is the witness currently receiving financial assistance form the State of California Board of Control, 
Victims of Crime Program? Yes 1 No 1 If yes, please explain. ___________ _ 
______________ (""signature) 
District Attorney Designee 
1 Approved 1 D isapproved 
CWPP Analyst 
CWPP Manager 
CWPP 1 (12/99) 
Date 
FOR CWPP PROGRAM USE ONLY 
Date 
Date 
(Page 2 of 2) 
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CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM 
Attachment 3 CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM 
CWPP AGREEMENT 
(To be completed by CWPP Program Analyst Only) 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
DEPARTMENT OF rusncE 
CALIFORNIA WITNESS 
PROTECTION PROGRAM 
CWPP AGREEMENT FY 99/2000 
\ NEW \RENEWAL I AMEND:MENT (NO 
District Attorney's Office 
Office 
Sacramento Coun District Attorne ' s Office 
Address 
1200 Town S uare, Sacramento, CA 
DIGEST OF CONT 
Mail To: California Department of Justice 
California Bureau oflnvestigation/CWPP 
P.O. Box 163029 
Sacramento, CA 95816-3029 
Attn: CWPP Program Analyst 
I AGREEMENT NO. \AGENCY NO 
District Attorney Representative 
Namefritle 
Jose h Smith, De u District Attome 
Telephone Number 
(916) 444-4444 
The California Witness rotection Program (CWPP), Title 7.5, Section 14021-1 033, of the California 
Penal Code, will Provid · · ttorney' s Office for the 
protection of one witness identified as Witness # ___ , endangered as a result of their involvement in a 
criminal matter 
Terms and Conditions: Reimbursement will be for relocation expenses, semi-permanent housing first and 
last months rent, rental and utility deposits, monthly rent, meals, utilities, and incidentals, in accordance 
with the California Witness Protection Program Policy and Procedures Manual governing witness 
protection services 
(Each district attorney 's office must maintain a record of original receipts for expenditures applied for the protection of witnesses) 
DOLLAR AMOUNT$$ ___ (Chapter 50/99) PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE __ To __ _ 
REASON FOR CONTRACT (IDENTIFY SPECIFIC PROBLEM MAKING lHE CONTRACT NECESSARY) 
The life of the witness is in danger due to their involvement in a criminal matter. CWPP funds will provide 
for the witness' continued protection until the case is concluded or financial assistance is no longer deemed 
necessary by the district attorney's office of as determined by the CWPP. 
DESCRIBE THE SERVICE WHICH WILL RESULT 
WERE OTHER FUNDING SOURCES UTILIZED BEFORE APPL YING WITH THE CWPP? 
Yes ! N o l 
Authorized Signature of District Attorney's Office 
Signature of Program Analyst 
CWPP 2 (12/99) 
Date 
Date 
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Attachment 4 CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM 
REIMBURSEMENT REQUEST LETTER 
(use district attorney' s office letterhead) 
Date 
-----------
California Department of Justice 
California Bureau of Investigation/CWPP 
P.O. Box 163029 
Sacramento, CA 95816-3029 
Attn: CWPP Program Analyst 
RE CWPP Agreement #_~---
Witness Identification # 
-----
As provided in CWPP Agreement # -~----- this office is requesting reirn bursement of monies 
spent while protecting Confidential Witness # and family members 
The expenses incurred we es) during the period of 
This represents a 
$______ The bre 
I verify that all require'd==1:n:s-1m,---mr,mrtmm,;ctiJ,y-the-drs:trn::rartrnm,y,s-ulfrc:<! pertaining to the above 
specified expenses. 








Mail to : 
California Department of Justice 
California Bureau oflnvestigation/CWPP 
P.O. Box 163029 
Sacramento, CA 95816-3029 
Attn: CWPP Analyst 
City 
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CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM 
Attachment 5 CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM 
LIST OF EXPENDITURES 
CWPP Aggreeement#:___________ Date: ___________ _ 




If personal vehicle used, __ x Miles x $.31 
Moving Van/Trailer Expenses 
Other Moving Expenses 
Storage of personal possessions 
LODGING AND MEALS 
















Utilities (need prior CWPP approval) 
Type of Service: 
Billing Dates: 
Utility Deposits: 

























(Page I of 2) 
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ARMED PROTECTION OR ESCORT 
Time Period from: _________ to __________ _ 
Number of protection and/or escort personnel ____ _ 
Overtime hours and costs devoted to armed protection or escort services ___ (OT Hrs) Amount$ 
Transportation costs devoted to armed protection or escort services Amount $ 
Per diem costs devoted to armed protection or escort services .ArnoWlt $ 
Lodging costs devoted to armed protection or escort sen.rices Amount $ 
(Please attach separate sheet for breakdown of e>.penses) Subtotal Costs $ 
ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW IDENTITY 
Include narrativ e of functions and costs related to the establishment of new identity 
HEALTHCARE 
Include narrative of functions and costs related to health care 
Subtotal Costs $ 
Subtotal Costs $ 
Grand Total $ 
I verify that all required receipts are maintained by the district attorney's office pertaining to the above 
specified expenses. 
Authorized Signature of District Attorney 's Office Date 
l Approved 1 Disapproved FOR CWPP PROGRAM USE ONLY 
CWPP Primary Analyst Date 
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Attachment 6 CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM 
AMENDMENT REQUEST LETTER 
California Department of Justice 
California Bureau of Investigation 
California Witness Protection Program 
P.O. Box 163029 
Sacramento, CA 95816-3029 
Attn: CWPP Program Analyst 
(Print on agency letterhead) 
Date 
We are requesting an Am toaP:Me t Wit # __ - The current 
agreement's period of per is o 
We are requesting$ __ _,___ di d ate tion witness services to 
include A breakdown of the am unts is attached. We are 
also requesting an extensi _____ to ______ _ 
If you have any questions, please contact ___________ at ( ) __ -___ - Our fax 
number is ( ) __ - __ -
Sincerely, 
Authorizd Signature of District Attorney's Office 
Representative's Title 
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Attachment 7 CALIFORNIA WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
The CWPP would appreciate your cooperation in completing this questionnaire. Your candid responses 
are extremely valuable in assessing the effectiveness of the CWPP. 
District A ttorney's Office : ______________ CWPP Agreement # : ________ _ 
Witness Identification #: 
--------------
Number of Family M embers Assisted: _______ _ 
Relationship(s) : __________ _ 
Results of Trial 
Defendant Name Convicted Of Sentence 
If case is still pending, anticipated trial date is: ______________________ _ 
Did defendant(s) plead guilty? 
Did witness ' testimony attribute to the guilty plea? 
Could case go to trial without testimony of witness? 
Would witness have testified without protection? 
Was your request handled expeditiously? 
Were any problems encountered? 
Yes N o 
Yes N o 
Yes N o 
Yes N o 
Yes N o 
Yes N o 
Explain: ____________________________________ _ 
What additional services would you like to see provided by the CWPP? 
Do you have any comments and/or suggestions concerning the C\VPP, its policy, or procedures? 
(signature/title) 
(date) 
CW PP 5 (12/99) 
